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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate birth order and gender effects on the development of children’s 
human capital in India. We investigate both indicators of the child’s current stock of human 
capital and of investment into their continued human capital accumulation, distinguishing 
between time investments and pecuniary investment into school quality. Our results show that in 
India, birth order effects are mostly negative. More specifically, birth order effects are negative 
for indicators of children's accumulated human capital stock and for indicators of pecuniary 
investments into school quality. These results are more in line with previous results from 
developed countries than from developing countries. However, for time investments, which are 
influenced by the opportunity cost of child time, birth order effects are positive. Gender aspects 
are also important. Girls are disadvantaged within families, and oldest son preferences can 
explain much of the within-household inequalities which we observe. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate birth order and gender effects on the development of children’s 
human capital in India. Our data on education inputs and outcomes is unusually rich. We 
investigate both indicators of the child’s current stock of human capital and of investment into 
their continued human capital accumulation, distinguishing between time investments and 
pecuniary investment into school quality. We also examine the impact on child labor and height 
for age. While not educational variables per se, these are relevant in understanding educational 
human capital accumulation.  
Higher birth order children are found in larger families. An analysis of birth order effects thus has 
to address the close relation between birth order and family size. In the Indian context family size 
is also related to child gender, with girls more often living in larger families (Jensen, 2003). To 
control for family size and other differences across families, we employ a within family model 
using sibship fixed effects. This is a common approach to avoid confounding family size effects 
with within-household inequalities. We also estimate separate regressions for each sibship size. 
There is an extensive literature showing negative birth order effects on human capital in 
developed countries. First-born children tend to perform better on measures of educational 
outcomes.1 Several competing explanations for the negative relationship have been postulated in 
the literature. These are mainly based on the idea that average resources per child decline as the 
number of children in the family increase. The literature from developing countries is much 
smaller, but suggests the opposite relationship. Later-born children tend to have better 
educational outcomes (Ejrnæs & Pörtner, 2004; Tenikue & Verheyden, 2010; De Haan et al, 
2014). The suggested explanation is more binding resource constraints combined with increasing 
family income over time, in particular if older siblings can contribute to household income 
(Parish and Willis, 1993; Sawada & Lokshin, 2009). 
Our results show that birth order effects are mostly negative in India. This is more in line with the 
findings in developed countries than with those in developing countries. The results for time 
                                                          
1 See for example Conley & Glauber (2006), Kantarevic & Mechoulan (2006), Heiland (2009), De Haan (2010), 
Hotz & Pantano (2015) and Lehmann et al (2016) for evidence from the United States. A similar pattern is found in 
several other high income countries (Black et al, 2005; Booth & Kee, 2009; Silles, 2010; Kristensen & Bjerkedal, 
2010; Bonesrønning  & Massih, 2011;  Härkönen, 2014; Barclay, 2015; Mechoulan & Wolff, 2015). 
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investment indicators do, however, follow the typical developing country pattern.  For all other 
outcomes, birth order effects are always negative. First-born children more often attend a private 
school, and their families spend more on their education. They have completed more grades, and 
they perform better on reading, writing and math tests.  
Having established negative birth order effects, we attempt to reconcile these results with positive 
birth order effects in other developing countries. One possibility is that different education 
indicators have different birth order effects. The previous literature has mostly estimated effects 
on time investment indicators, though completed grades has also been used. We include a much 
wider range of indicators of both investment and human capital stock. Our results for time 
investment indicators indeed show a similar pattern as in the previous literature from developing 
countries. Birth order effects on child labor are negative, and birth order effects on enrollment 
and school hours are positive in families where effects exist.  
Earlier papers from developing countries have found evidence supporting an important role of 
financial resource constraints. Hence, another potential explanation behind differences in results 
could be that such financial resource constraints are less important for human capital 
development in India than in previously studied countries. Our results suggest that credit 
constraints and poverty only matter in the case of time investments. This speaks for shifting focus 
from credit constraints in general, which should affect also pecuniary investment, towards 
opportunity costs of child time, which should matter most for time investments in credit 
constrained households.  
Another potential explanation for the observed negative birth order effects in India is son 
preferences, favoring in particular the oldest son. Jayachandran and Pande (2015) show negative 
birth order effects in India for early life health outcomes, and argue that strong son preferences, 
where in particular the oldest son is favored, drive these results. Our results provide some support 
for this hypothesis, with oldest sons enjoying a particular advantage in educational investments. 
Son preference does not, however, appear to fully explain the observed negative relationship. 
Our results also indicate that girls are disadvantaged within families, both with regard to 
investment into their human capital accumulation and with regard to the human capital stock that 
they possess. The one exception where girls do not appear to be disadvantaged is with regard to 
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completed grades. This is despite the fact they are disadvantaged with regard to school 
enrollment as well as hours spent on schooling, thus suggesting that girls might be better 
provided with some ability of importance for academic success. Girls are not equally 
disadvantaged in all families: they are less so in small families, in rich families, and in families or 
geographical areas where we have reasons to expect weaker son preferences.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Foremost, we contribute to the 
small but growing literature on birth order effects on education in developing countries. We 
employ a wider range of measures of human capital compared to most of the existing literature, 
including both measures of children’s human capital stock and of different forms of education 
investment.  This allows for a more nuanced picture of the relationship between birth order and 
human capital development. We can thus shed further light on both the extent to which birth 
order effects in developing countries differ from those in developed countries, and on the reasons 
behind such differences. In particular, we show that birth order effects are not always positive in 
developing countries, and that they might differ depending on the type of education indicator. 
Positive birth order effects are more likely for time investment, since these are influenced by the 
opportunity cost of child time. They are less likely for indicators of pecuniary investments into 
school quality or for indicators of children’s accumulated human capital stock. An additional 
contribution is that this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that investigates the effect 
of birth order on educational attainment in India using family fixed effects. We also contribute to 
the literature on the consequences of son preferences in India. We confirm that boys are favored 
over girls within families for a wide range of outcomes, and further show that this applies 
especially for oldest sons. Boys, and in particular oldest sons, are more advantaged in investment 
into their education than in the human capital stock they possess. Moreover, gender-specific 
fertility stopping rules can explain some of the birth order and gender patterns observed in the 
Indian families. However, oldest son preferences do not appear to fully explain the negative birth 
order effects in education.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous research, 
section 3 presents the data and variables, section 4 introduces the conceptual framework and 
empirical model, while section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 investigates the potential 
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mechanisms credit constraints and son preferences, and section 7 discusses and concludes the 
paper. 
2. Review of previous research 
Empirical findings on birth order effects in developed and developing countries 
While early empirical research consistently exhibited a negative relationship between birth order 
and education, the results were often based on cross-sectional data, and did not speak to a causal 
mechanism. More recently, however, researchers have been able to establish a causal relationship 
by means of instrumental variables and/or fixed effects estimations. Much of this newer research 
uses data from the United States and confirms a negative birth order effect on education. Earlier 
born children have on average higher educational attainment and perform better on various tests 
of ability (Conley & Glauber, 2006; Kantarevic & Mechoulan, 2006; Heiland, 2009; De Haan, 
2010; Lehmann et al, 2016; Hotz & Pantano, 2015). A similar pattern is found in several other 
high income countries, including the United Kingdom (Booth & Kee, 2009; Silles, 2010), 
Germany (Härkönen, 2014), France (Mechoulan & Wolff, 2015), Norway (Black et al, 2005; 
Kristensen & Bjerkedal, 2010; Bonesrønning  & Massih, 2011), and Sweden (Barclay, 2015). 
There has been less investigation into the effect of birth order on educational outcomes in 
developing countries. The existing literature has found positive birth order effects in the 
Philippines (Ejrnæs & Pörtner, 2004), Ecuador (De Haan et al, 2014), Bolivia (Zeng et al, 2012), 
sub-Saharan Africa (Tenikue & Verheyden, 2010), Nicaragua and Guatemala (Dammert, 2010), 
and Ethiopia (Lindskog, 2013). This is the exact opposite relationship as compared to the results 
in high income countries. However, in the cases where the above studies have split the sample 
between relatively rich and relatively poor households, the results in the relatively rich 
households are weak or even reversed, with a negative relationship between birth order and 
education outcomes. 
While the majority of studies have found a linear relationship between birth order and education, 
there are a few exceptions. Dayioğlu et al (2009) find a non- monotonous relationship between 
birth order and school attendance in urban Turkey, while Sanhueza (2009) finds a non- 
monotonous relationship between birth order and years of schooling in Chile. In both cases, 
middle born children appear to fare worse than their older and younger siblings. 
5 
 
There are two studies of birth order effects on education outcomes in India that we are aware of. 
These studies come to conflicting conclusions. Makino (2012) investigates the relationship 
between birth order and test scores.  She finds that there are no birth order effects for girls, while 
there are significant negative birth order effects for boys with older brothers. Her main strategy to 
deal with the correlation between birth order and family size is the use of a relative birth order 
measure. She performs some within-household regressions, but her data include few families 
with more than one sibling.  Kumar (2016) investigates the relationship between birth order and 
years of schooling. His results show significant positive birth order effects. He controls for family 
size and uses gender of the first-born as an instrument. However, the gender of siblings might 
have an independent effect on educational outcomes in India. Hence, it remains unclear if it is 
really birth order effects that drive his results. Therefore, the effect of birth order on educational 
outcomes in India remains an open question. 
Suggested pathways though which birth order could affect schooling 
Several theories address the negative relationship between birth order and educational attainment 
in developed countries. One hypothesis is that biological factors drive the observed relationship. 
The general argument is that earlier born children are healthier for reasons relating to mothers’ 
health and behavior during pregnancy. Empirical results on this theory tend to conflict. Some 
studies find that first-born have better early life/biological outcomes while others find the 
opposite.2 Regardless, negative birth order effects in education persist even when controlling for 
early-life outcomes. Furthermore, Kristensen & Bjerkedal (2007) find that IQ scores of 
Norwegian military conscripts is dependent on the individual’s social rank within the family, not 
strict biological birth order. Similarly, Barclay (2015) finds a negative birth order effect in a 
sample restricted to families where all siblings are adopted. This indicates that biological factors 
do not play a key role in determining this effect. Therefore, the biological view does not seem to 
be the most relevant.  
A model that is more in line with the results found in Kristensen & Bjerkedal (2007) and Barclay 
(2015) is the confluence model. This model was developed in the psychology literature in the 
                                                          
2 Lehmann et al (2016) find for example that mothers reduce their cigarette consumption less with later-born 
children. In contrast, Black et al (2011) in a study on birth order and IQ in Norway find that early born children have, 
if anything, a slight disadvantage at birth. 
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mid-1970s to explain a negative relationship between birth order and intelligence. The model 
argues that the intellectual environment within the family is crucial for the intellectual 
development of children (Zajonc & Markus, 1975; Zajonc, 1976; Zajonc et al. 1979). The 
intellectual environment, in turn, is modelled as a weighted average of the parents’ and children’s 
intelligence. Each child added to the family enters into a lower intellectual environment 
compared to the previous child. This leads to negative birth order effects. The model also predicts 
that spacing between siblings will be important, with closely spaced children facing a greater 
disadvantage than more widely spaced children. Zajonc et al (1979) further argue that the earlier 
born children may benefit from having younger siblings to teach, meaning that last-born and only 
children are at a disadvantage compared to others of the same birth order.  
Another postulated explanation to the negative relationship between birth order and educational 
attainment is the resource dilution hypothesis. This hypothesis is similar to the confluence model, 
but in this case the important inputs to child development are parents’ time and material 
resources. As family size increases, there will be less time and money per child. First-born 
children will therefore have the advantage of relatively more parental resources, at least during 
the period when they are the only child. Each additional child will have a similar advantage over 
their later-born siblings, but a disadvantage compared to their older siblings. The advantage faced 
by earlier born children is exacerbated by the fact that early-life investments in human capital 
have a persistent positive impact on educational outcomes. It also increases the productivity of 
future investments (Cunha & Heckman, 2007).  
Hao et al (2008) model strategic parental behavior whereby parents discipline their first-born 
children more strictly in order to serve as an example to the later-born children. The first-borns 
thus gain an advantage from the additional parental attention. Hotz and Pantano (2013) test the 
model empirically on data from the United States. They find that parents’ disciplinary actions 
towards their children decrease with birth order.  
The models discussed above all predict negative birth order effects, despite differences in the 
underlying mechanisms. In many developing countries, however, positive birth order effects on 
human capital accumulation have been found. One hypothesis is that credit constraints can 
explain these positive birth order effects. Families facing a credit constraint will be unable to 
fully equalize the amount of resources allocated to each child. They may therefore be more likely 
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to have their early-born children participate in labor or child care and less likely to participate in 
education (Lafortune and Lee, 2014). Later-born children thus benefit from the extra income 
generated by their older siblings. They also benefit from the fact that household income tends to 
increase over time (Parish and Willis, 1993).  
Ejrnæs & Pörtner (2004) present a model where household fertility is endogenous. Parents 
employ a fertility stopping rule dependent on the endowment of their children, meaning they stop 
having children once a child with a sufficiently high endowment is born. Further, parents choose 
to reinforce rather than compensate differences between children via investments in human 
capital. These strategies lead to positive birth order effects, as last-born children will be the 
children with the highest endowments and thus receive the most human capital investment. 
Are boys and girls treated differently in Indian families? 
Birth order effects and intra-household allocation of resources may differ by gender, both in a 
developed and a developing country setting (Härkönen, 2014; Kristensen & Bjerkedal, 2010; 
Dayioğlu et al., 2009; Ejrnæs & Pörtner, 2004). Often, the results show that girls are 
disadvantaged within the household.3   
One explanation, often applied to India in particular, is that a preference for sons lies behind 
these results (Behrman, 1988; Pande, 2003, Jayachandran and Pande, 2015). Son preferences 
influence a wide range of behaviors in India, and a number of studies document that girls fare 
worse than boys (Arnold et al., 1998; Barecello et al., 2014). Some researchers claim that this can 
be attributed to girls on average living in larger families due to gender-specific fertility stopping 
rules rather than due to unfavorable treatment of girls within a given family. This implies equal 
treatment within households but unequal outcomes between households (Jensen, 2003). However, 
there is evidence that girls are not treated equally within families, but rather fare worse than their 
male siblings. For example, Barecello et al. (2014) find that boys in India receive significantly 
higher early life investments than their female siblings, measured in terms of parental time, 
vaccinations, breastfeeding, etc. Azam and Kingdon (2013) use the 1993 and 2004 waves of the 
IHDS to investigate whether girls are disadvantaged in India. They find that within families, girls 
are disadvantaged in enrollment, education expenditure and the private-public school choice. 
                                                          
3 There are exceptions to this where girls instead face an advantage; for example Ejrnæs & Pörtner (2004) and 
Kristensen & Bjerkedal (2010) 
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They also find that girls’ disadvantage is more pronounced when looking at the within family 
specification compared to the between family specification.  
Jayachandran and Pande (2015) investigate the role of preferences in favor of the oldest son in 
particular in driving negative birth order effects in height for age. They find that oldest sons are 
taller than their younger siblings, and that the birth order gradient is steeper in India than in the 
sub-Saharan African data they compare with. Similar results are found with other measures of 
early life health investments, such as pre- and post-natal health checks and vaccinations. 
Daughters in India are found to be at a particular disadvantage vis-à-vis daughters in Africa if 
they do not have any older brothers. This is driven by the fact that in families where there is a 
strong son preference, there is an incentive to increase family size until a boy is born. When 
daughters are born into the family before a son, the family will have an incentive to save 
resources for the male child they hope to have in the future. These results indicate that a 
combination of strategic parental decisions and resource dilution interact to produce negative 
birth order effects in India. Jayachandran and Pande find that the steep birth order gradient is 
driven by the Hindus. They further find that the negative birth order effects are not present in 
matrilineal Kerala. 
Son preferences are often framed as parents placing a higher weight on the utility of male 
children than of female children. Another potential explanation is that the returns to educating 
boys may be significantly higher than the returns to educating girls. This could be either due to 
labor market conditions or patrilocal traditions. Conversely, the opportunity costs of educating 
girls may be higher (Kumar, 2013). It is likely that both of these aspects influence parental 
decisions. 
3. Data and variables 
Our data comes from the 2004 - 05 and 2011 - 12 rounds of the India Human Development 
Survey (IHDS). This is a nationally representative survey of 42152 households covering 1420 
villages and 1042 urban neighborhoods in India. The data has been collected as part of a joint 
project between the University of Maryland in the United States and the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research in India. The surveys were administered via interviews conducted in 
the local language, and cover a wide variety of socioeconomic topics. We have information that 
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links each child to their mother. In order to determine the birth order of a child, we make use of 
the eligible women file. This includes the birth history of all women in the sample between the 
ages 15 and 49. We restrict the sample to cases where both the mothers and their husbands have 
not been previously married, creating a sample of full siblings (i.e. without half siblings or step-
siblings). As there are cases where extended families are living in one household, we observe 
cases where there is more than one sibship per household. We exclude multiple birth children 
(twins, triplets), since their birth order is not well-defined. For the sake of our analysis, we further 
restrict our sub-sample to families where the sibship size is between 2 and 6.4  
The estimation sample differs across different dependent variables. Most dependent variables are 
estimated on children aged 6 to 17, but test scores are only available for children age 8-11. There 
needs to be non-missing data from at least two children in a sibship for it to be included in the 
estimation sample. Often there is data on more than one child from each of the two surveys. 
Sibships are also included if there is data from one child in 2004-05 and another child in 2011-12. 
This substantially increases the test scores estimation sample.   
Variables 
Our main explanatory variable is absolute birth order. We construct dummy variables for birth 
orders one, two, three and four plus, the last of which takes a value of one if the child’s birth 
order is 4, 5 or 6 and zero otherwise. A particular strength of the data set is that it includes an 
unusually rich set of educational information. We have variables measuring enrollment, hours 
spent in school or doing homework, type of schooling, school related expenses, completed 
grades, and test scores for reading, writing and mathematics. The data also includes variables that 
do not directly measure educational outcomes, but which are still relevant to understand human 
capital accumulation. We use information on child labor and height-for-age Z scores (HAZ). The 
information on child labor is relevant since it represents an alternative use of child time. HAZ is 
relevant since it is a measure that will capture differences in early life investment and 
environment (Silventoinen, 2003; Li et al., 2003). It has been shown to be correlated with both 
health human capital and cognitive and non-cognitive skills (Glewwe et al., 2001; Alderman et 
al., 2001). 
                                                          
4 We exclude larger families, since they are not common, and since we do not want unusual families to drive the high 
birth order results.  
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As mentioned earlier, our dependent variables can be categorized into indicators of the child’s 
current human capital stock and investments into the child’s continued human capital 
accumulation. The indicators of current human capital are the scores on reading, writing and 
mathematics tests, the number of completed grades, and the height-for-age z-score.  Cunha and 
Heckman (2008) show that test scores are not only influenced by cognitive, but also non-
cognitive skills. The same is likely to hold for completed grades. Our indicators of investments 
are enrollment, child labor, total hours, private school and expenses. The first three are indicators 
of time invested in schooling, where the total hours most directly corresponds to what we intend 
to measure. Enrollment and child labor are also valuable indicators of children’s time use, and 
they are the main variables that have previously been studied in a developing country context. 
Private schooling and school expenses are indicators of investment into school quality.  
Though total hours is only collected for children who are enrolled, we set it to zero for all 
children who are not enrolled and estimate it on the full sample. Private school and Expenses is 
also collected only for children who are enrolled in school, and in the main estimations we 
estimate them on the conditional samples. Thus the estimation samples for these outcomes are 
endogenous. We run robustness estimations were we have coded the expenses, and the private 
school attendance as zero for all children who are not enrolled in school, but prefer to keep the 
estimations based on the conditional samples in the main analysis since they are easier to 
interpret. The test scores for reading, writing and mathematics have been collected for all 
children age 8-11 at the time of the survey.  
Enrollment, child labor, and private school are dummy variables taking a value of 1 if the child is 
enrolled in school, works more than 240 hours a year, or is enrolled in a private school, 
respectively, and zero otherwise. Total hours combines the hours of school, hours of homework 
and hours of private tuition per week used by the child, while expenses measures the cost of 
school fees, books, uniforms, bus fare and private tuition fees in rupees. The reading score runs 
from 0 (cannot read) to 4 (read a story), with the intermediate values 1 (letter), 2 (word) and 3 
(paragraph). The writing score is equal to zero if the child cannot write and one if the child can 
write with 2 or less mistakes. The math score runs between 0 (cannot count) and 3 (division), 
with the intermediate values 1 (number) and 2 (subtraction). The test scores variables are the 
same as Makino (2012) uses in her analysis. We have an additional round of data from 2010-11 
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and thus have a much larger sample of families with at least two children in the data. This allows 
us to rely on a within-sibship analysis. We have standardized the test scores and the numbers of 
completed grades, such that they measure age-specific standard deviations from the mean, using 
the sample population as the age-specific reference. The HAZ was constructed using the WHO 
reference tables from 2007.  
4. Theoretical framework and empirical model 
Theoretical framework 
In this sub-section we sketch a theoretical framework for current human capital stock and 
investment into continued human capital accumulation. This serves to guide the structure and 
interpretation of our empirical results. Starting with the human capital stock, there is now 
compelling evidence of the importance of early life investment and complementarities between 
early and late childhood. Hence, we use the human capital production function in Cunha and 
Heckman (2007) as our point of departure. In contrast to earlier models of human capital 
accumulation such as Becker and Tomes (1994), childhood consists of many periods. It is 
important to at least distinguish early childhood from late childhood. School investment occurs 
during late childhood.  
Human capital, in the form of different cognitive and non-cognitive skills and abilities, depends 
on parental characteristics, initial endowments and investments. Formally, human capital of 
sibling i in the next period ℎ𝑡𝑡+1,𝑖𝑖 is a function of parental characteristics, 𝜔𝜔, current human 
capital, ℎ𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖, and various investments, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 :   ℎ𝑡𝑡+1,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓( 𝜔𝜔,ℎ𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 ). The parental characteristics 
could be thought of more broadly as encompassing home environment, such that sibling 
interaction would also be included. This implies that 𝜔𝜔 differs across siblings. Complementarities 
between early and late childhood implies that late childhood investment will have higher returns 
for children who already possess higher human capital. That is 𝛿𝛿
2𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿ℎ𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿
> 0, which creates an equity 
efficiency trade-off for late childhood investment.  
The current stock of human capital, which is what we estimate empirically, is the outcome of 
initial endowments of the child, home environment, and all prior investments in the child’s 
human capital; 
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(1)  ℎ𝜏𝜏,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓( 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,ℎ0,𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(0,𝜏𝜏),𝑖𝑖 ).  
We do not observe the arguments of the human capital production function, but estimate the 
reduced form effects of gender and birth order. While there are no reasons to expect that initial 
endowments ℎ0,𝑖𝑖 should differ systematically with gender or birth order, 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 will differ by birth 
order if it includes sibling interaction. Earlier investments 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(0,𝜏𝜏),𝑖𝑖 might vary with both birth 
order and gender. Note that current human capital could be viewed both as the outcome of human 
capital formation up until data collection and as arguments in the human capital production 
function. 
Next, to arrive at an expression for education investment, we assume the simplest possible model. 
There are two periods; the current (late childhood of the children) and the future (when the 
children are grown-up). Parents invest in children’s human capital in the current period to 
maximize the sum of their utility over the two periods. Parents receive utility from household 
consumption in the current period, 𝑐𝑐1, and from household consumption and grown-up children’s 
human capital in the next period, 𝑐𝑐2 and ℎ2,𝑖𝑖. We abstract from discount rates and interest rates to 
simplify. Parents’ utility function is 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐1) + 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐2,𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖ℎ2,𝑖𝑖). They maximize total expected 
utility subject to the human capital production functions of their children and subject to the 
current and future period budget constraints. The human capital production function of each child 
is ℎ2,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓( 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖,ℎ2,𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 ). The current period budget constraint is 𝑦𝑦1𝑝𝑝 + ∑ 𝑦𝑦1,𝑖𝑖 =𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐1 + ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 +
𝑠𝑠, where parents income, 𝑦𝑦1
𝑝𝑝, is given, but where child income, 𝑦𝑦1,𝑖𝑖, depends on child labor, and 
thereby on the time they invest in education. Let 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 be the child wage rate. Then 𝑦𝑦1,𝑖𝑖 =
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗� for time investments. Returning to the budget constraint, 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 is the pecuniary cost of 
investment j, and s is savings. The future period budget constraint is 𝑦𝑦2
𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐2. The 𝜃𝜃:s are the 
value to parents of grown-up children’s human capital, and can vary across children. It can be 
thought of as including both altruism and different types of transfers to the parents.5 Substitution 
of constraints into the utility function and maximization with respect to human capital 
investments gives the following first order condition for time investments and pecuniary 
investment into school quality respectively: 
                                                          
5 Transfers to parents could have been modeled as part of future period income instead, but we prefer to keep it as 
simple as possible. 
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(2)  𝜃𝜃𝑠𝑠
𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∙)𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐1 (𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 + 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗),  
(3) 𝜃𝜃 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∙)𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐1 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗,  
where the right hand side is the marginal cost of investment j for child s, and the left hand side is 
the parents’ marginal benefit of that investment. The marginal benefit increases with 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , parents’ 
valuation of increased human capital for child i, and with 𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  , the marginal productivity of  
investment j in increasing child i’s human capital. If, as in the model of Cunha and Heckman, we 
assume that 𝛿𝛿
2𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿ℎ
> 0, then an investment will increase human capital more among children who 
already possess higher human capital, creating an equality- efficiency trade-off. Turning to the 
marginal cost of investment j, it increases with 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 , the pecuniary cost, and, for time investments, 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖, the opportunity cost of child time. The impact of these costs on parents’ marginal utility also 
increases with 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐1
, the marginal utility of increased current period consumption. This term is 
higher among credit constrained households, creating a downward pressure on educational 
investment in these families.  
Again, we estimate the reduced form effects of birth order and gender. With the exception of 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗, 
all other terms can differ with birth order and gender. Parents’ valuation of child human capital, 
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , can differ either because of differential degrees of altruism, or because children are expected 
to contribute differently to parents in their old age. The marginal productivity of the investment,  
𝛿𝛿𝑓𝑓(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, , differs if the current human capital stock differs. The marginal utility of current period 
consumption, 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿(∙)
𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐1
,  differs with birth order if the family is credit constrained and family income, 
as has been suggested, increases over time. The marginal cost depends on the interaction between 
the marginal utility of current period consumption and the opportunity cost and the pecuniary 
cost respectively. Edmonds (2006) shows how children of different birth order and gender have 
different comparative advantage, with older children more productive in child labor. While 
younger siblings should be equally productive when they reach a certain age, this will influence 
their educational investments less if the family is by then less credit constrained. Depending on 
context, there might also be differences in returns to child labor between boys and girls. 
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Empirical model 
We are interested in within-household inequalities in human capital formation. Are there any 
systematic inequalities related to birth order and gender? By necessity birth order is correlated 
with family size, and in India gender has also been shown to be so (Jensen, 2003). To ensure that 
we do not confuse differences in human capital accumulation across families, depending on for 
example family size, with within-household inequalities we use sibship fixed effect. In addition 
we control for a full set of age dummies and survey round. The basic model is 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏2𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏3𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3 ∗ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏4𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜6𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4
∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + �𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝜋𝜋 + 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡, the outcome of child i in sibship s at time t, are our measures of children’s current 
human capital stock and of investment into their continued human capital accumulation. 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 is 
a full set of child age dummies, and 𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 is  a survey round dummy.  𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 are sibship fixed effects, 
which captures differences in family size, and all other time constant differences across families.  
In our main estimations we use linear sibship fixed effects regressions for all outcomes. For the 
binary outcomes, enrollment, child labor and private school we therefore estimate the linear 
probability model. We estimate alternative models as a robustness check (the conditional logit 
and the correlated random effects probit). Standard errors are always clustered at the sibship 
level.  
Even if only within family variation is used for identification of birth order effects, all families 
will not contribute to the estimation of all birth order effects. In particular, only large families can 
contribute to the high birth order effects. If birth order effects differ with family size, this will 
affect the pattern of birth order effects that we estimate. To deal with this we follow Black et al. 
(2005) and estimate separate regressions for each sibship size (2, 3, 4. 5 and 6). Note, however, 
that fertility might not be completed in all families, making the division into family sizes 
somewhat blurry.6  
                                                          
6 We have also run sibship-size-specific estimations only for sibships whose size is at least as large as the mother’s 
expressed preferred number. This reduces the sample mostly for sibships of size 2, but to some degree also for 
sibships of size 3. The results of these estimations (not presented but available from the authors) are very similar to 
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5. Main results  
Starting with the indicators of children’s current human capital stock (Table 1), the results show 
clear negative birth order effects across the board. The higher the birth order, the fewer grades 
she has completed, the lower her scores on the reading-, writing- and math tests, and the shorter 
she is for her age. In the case of education investment indicators (Table 2) the pattern is mixed. 
For private schooling and school expenses - the indicators of pecuniary investment into school 
quality - the pattern is the same as for human capital stock indicators: there are clear negative 
birth order effects. Time investment indicators show a different pattern. While birth order effects 
on child labor are expected to have the opposite sign of those on education variables, our results 
show that birth order effects on child labor are strictly negative. Further, while the first-born child 
appears to be enrolled more often than the second born, the children of birth orders 4 to 6 have 
the highest enrollment, i.e. birth order effects appear to be non-monotonic. The number of hours 
spent on schooling shows a similar pattern, with second-born children again appearing to be the 
most disadvantaged. The difference in birth order effects on time investments compared to on 
pecuniary investments into school quality indicates that opportunity cost of child time is 
influential.  
Table 1: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock – coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
  0.076 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -1.934 
Second born -0.204*** -0.142*** -0.126*** -0.157*** -0.346*** 
 (0.010) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) 
Third born -0.360*** -0.257*** -0.186*** -0.295*** -0.674*** 
 (0.019) (0.063) (0.061) (0.057) (0.062) 
Fourth to sixth 
  
-0.446*** -0.329*** -0.335*** -0.436*** -1.051*** 
 (0.029) (0.098) (0.091) (0.088) (0.095) 
Female 0.008 -0.047** -0.052** -0.126*** -0.059*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.05 
N 64,577 7,628 7,544 7,603 29,647 
Sibships 20,829   3,610 3,570 3,598 10,898 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
the results of estimations including also sibships whose size is smaller than the mother’s expressed preferred number 
of children.  
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Table 2: The effect of birth order on educational investment-coefficients from linear sibship fixed 
effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private school School expenses 
 0.921 0.082 39.351 0.300 3171.878 
Second born -0.015*** -0.005 -1.313*** -0.021*** -410.537*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.194) (0.004) (61.272) 
Third born 0.002 -0.028*** -0.961*** -0.034*** -584.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.346) (0.008) (104.350) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.042*** -0.064*** 0.502 -0.050*** -702.911*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.532) (0.012) (156.426) 
Female -0.015*** -0.020*** -0.826*** -0.056*** -551.148*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.130) (0.003) (38.771) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.15 
N 60,523 64,647 54,326 52,436 47,571 
Sibships 19,998 20,842 18,309 18,041 16,736 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Turning to gender differences, girls exhibit a human capital stock disadvantage in comparison to 
their brothers. They perform worse on the reading-, writing- and mathematics test and have lower 
HAZ. Nonetheless, there is one exception: girls are not disadvantaged in terms of the number of 
completed grades. Girls also receive less education investment than boys. They are less often 
enrolled, spend fewer hours on schooling, are less likely to attend a private school and have less 
money spent on their education. However, they are also less likely to participate in child labor. 
Unfortunately, however, we do not have information on domestic work, which is likely to be 
more common among girls.  Since we use sibship fixed effects, the fact that educational 
investment are lower for girls than for boys clearly indicates that girls are treated differently than 
boys within the family. The difference in human capital stock between boys and girls is also 
likely to reflect past differences in investment depending on gender. Girls have, however, 
completed as many grades as boys, perhaps indicating that they have been better provided with 
some skill or ability which matters for academic success.  
 Heterogeneous results across family size  
Tables 3 and 4 show family-size-specific birth order and gender effects. These estimations fulfil 
two purposes. First, heterogeneity related to family size is interesting in itself. Second, it can be 
seen as a robustness check, since all families do not contribute equally to all effects in the pooled 
sample.  
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Table 3: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different sizes – 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.348 0.334 0.366 0.352 -1.751 
Second born -0.236*** -0.146 -0.205* -0.250** -0.389** 
 (0.020) (0.100) (0.105) (0.116) (0.164) 
Female 0.054*** 0.094** 0.064 -0.048 -0.200** 
 (0.012) (0.046) (0.051) (0.050) (0.089) 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.05 
N 15,048 1,332 1,308 1,326 1,430 
Sibships 6,509 665 653 662 714 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.184 0.136 0.106 0.074 -2.004 
Second born -0.204*** -0.188*** -0.100 -0.164** -0.533*** 
 (0.018) (0.062) (0.071) (0.066) (0.137) 
Third born -0.435*** -0.307*** -0.066 -0.333*** -1.050*** 
 (0.033) (0.113) (0.128) (0.116) (0.258) 
Female 0.043*** 0.000 -0.033 -0.057 -0.191*** 
 (0.011) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.064) 
R2 0.06 0.03 0.13 0.02 0.12 
N 20,466 2,318 2,274 2,298 2,596 
Sibships 6,789 1,122 1,100 1,112 1,249 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean -0.012 -0.030 -0.046 -0.059 -2.057 
Second born -0.167*** -0.235** -0.307*** -0.225*** -0.476*** 
 (0.025) (0.093) (0.078) (0.081) (0.116) 
Third born -0.365*** -0.373** -0.467*** -0.371*** -0.916*** 
 (0.042) (0.169) (0.123) (0.137) (0.184) 
Fourth to sixth 
born 
-0.529*** -0.578** -0.657*** -0.677*** -1.188*** 
(0.061) (0.255) (0.176) (0.198) (0.260) 
Female -0.017 -0.092** -0.097* -0.170*** -0.089 
 (0.015) (0.046) (0.052) (0.049) (0.080) 
R2 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.08 
N 14,617 1,818 1,809 1,822 2,074 
Sibships 4,206 866 863 869 972 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean -0.237 -0.272 -0.219 -0.308 -2.167 
Second born -0.144*** -0.257** -0.177* -0.145 -0.215 
 (0.033) (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.185) 
Third born -0.282*** -0.504*** -0.259* -0.387*** -0.670** 
 (0.047) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.302) 
Fourth to sixth 
born 
-0.474*** -0.530*** -0.329* -0.444** -1.136** 
(0.067) (0.199) (0.194) (0.206) (0.460) 
Female -0.068*** -0.103 -0.074 -0.190*** -0.234* 
 (0.022) (0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.123) 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 8,979 1,271 1,264 1,266 1,538 
Sibships 2,191 576 574 574 687 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean -0.326 -0.456 -0.350 0.972 -2.210 
Second born -0.071 -0.251 -0.307** -0.131 0.010 
 (0.049) (0.155) (0.139) (0.127) (0.214) 
Third born -0.113* -0.285 -0.389** -0.151 -0.260 
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 (0.061) (0.179) (0.163) (0.140) (0.275) 
Fourth to sixth 
born 
-0.145* -0.204 -0.441** -0.196 -0.457 
(0.083) (0.227) (0.197) (0.175) (0.377) 
Female -0.069** -0.197** -0.095 -0.240*** -0.217* 
 (0.029) (0.077) (0.071) (0.067) (0.119) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 
N 5,467 889 889 891 1,040 
Sibships 1,134 381 380 381 430 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 4: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.972 0.038 43.903 0.404 5248.301 
Second born 0.000 -0.016*** -0.953** -0.026*** -427.580*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.426) (0.009) (154.570) 
Female -0.002 -0.001 -0.160 -0.040*** -553.818*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.221) (0.006) (108.939) 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.19 
N 14,651 15,057 12,839 13,467 12,617 
Sibships 6,353 6,513 5,647 5,890 5,554 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.934 0.074 40.380 0.304 3087.832 
Second born -0.008 -0.025*** -1.111*** -0.017** -677.453*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.346) (0.008) (137.975) 
Third born 0.004 -0.048*** -1.251** -0.024 -1,092.017*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.632) (0.015) (250.760) 
Female -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.716*** -0.057*** -584.820*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.215) (0.005) (62.792) 
R2 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.15 
N 19,549 20,485 17,628 17,157 15,690 
Sibships 6,544 6,795 6,035 5,884 5,470 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.898 0.098 37.290 0.250 2096.006 
Second born 0.009 -0.026*** -0.215 -0.026** -359.531*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.465) (0.010) (119.567) 
Third born 0.023* -0.043*** 0.048 -0.032* -704.372*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.735) (0.017) (228.818) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
0.025 -0.045*** -0.290 -0.044* -690.623** 
(0.019) (0.017) (1.067) (0.025) (325.108) 
Female -0.026*** -0.027*** -1.337*** -0.061*** -495.777*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.291) (0.007) (58.057) 
R2 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.17 
N 13,600 14,628 12,345 11,461 10,224 
Sibships 3,991 4,207 3,720 3,539 3,237 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean 0.871 0.124 35.219 0.215 1686.569 
Second born 0.002 -0.042*** -0.457 -0.034** -247.985** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.658) (0.015) (116.702) 
Third born 0.006 -0.052*** -0.837 -0.061*** -522.110*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.865) (0.022) (134.263) 
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Fourth to 
sixth born 
0.026 -0.064*** -0.160 -0.065** -687.323*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (1.227) (0.032) (193.853) 
Female -0.023*** -0.035*** -1.104*** -0.059*** -550.448*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.396) (0.009) (85.027) 
R2 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.11 
N 7,931 9,001 7,145 6,464 5,696 
Sibships 2,040 2,193 1,891 1,781 1,611 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean 0.860 0.125 34.410 0.212 1551.217 
Second born 0.057** -0.016 1.740* -0.029 -119.108 
 (0.022) (0.019) (1.054) (0.022) (116.581) 
Third born 0.089*** -0.061*** 2.877** -0.036 -51.023 
 (0.024) (0.022) (1.249) (0.027) (185.724) 
Fourth to 
sixth born 
0.103*** -0.059** 3.411** -0.053 -145.063 
(0.028) (0.027) (1.546) (0.033) (270.653) 
Female -0.028*** -0.037*** -1.546*** -0.070*** -481.747*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.514) (0.013) (107.969) 
R2 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.08 
N 4,792 5,476 4,369 3,887 3,344 
Sibships 1,070 1,134 1,016 947 864 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Negative birth order effects on human capital stock indicators are found across all family sizes 
(Tables 3), though they are statistically weak for writing test scores in 2- and 3-child families and 
for all indicators in 6-child families. Turning to educational investment (Table 4), pecuniary 
investment into school quality also show a similar pattern. There are negative birth order effects 
across all family sizes. In contrast, the effects of birth order on time investment differ across 
family sizes. In large families there seems to be more of a tradeoff between child work and 
education, and birth order effects follow the pattern found in other developing countries. The 
negative birth order gradient on child labor is particularly strong in larger families, but is found 
for all family sizes. In small families there are no birth order effects on enrollment, but earlier 
born siblings spend more hours on their schooling than later-born. In large families there are 
positive birth order effects on enrollment. In 6-child families there are also positive birth order 
effects on hours spent on schooling. The birth order effects on hours are not statistically 
significant in the 4- and 5-child families.7 While the effect of being second-born on enrollment 
was negative and statistically significant in the combined sample, there are no negative 
statistically significant birth order effects on enrollment for any given family size. There are 
                                                          
7 The positive birth order effects on enrolment and the negative ones on hours conditional on being enrolled probably 
cancel in these families.  
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positive ones for larger families. Thus, the birth order effects on time investment into education is 
not non-monotonic within given families. 
Girls are less disadvantaged in small families than in large families. In particular, girls in small 
families fare well in comparison to their brothers on the education related human capital stock 
indicators. In 2-child families girls have better reading scores and have completed more grades 
than their brothers. In 3-child families they have completed more grades than their brothers. The 
only indicator where girls appear to be disadvantaged in small families is the HAZ. In larger 
families, girls do worse than their brothers on all indicators. In terms of education investment 
(Table 4), girls are disadvantaged across all family sizes both with regard to pecuniary investment 
into school quality and with regard to time investment. Hence, even if girls’ human capital stock 
appears to be at least as good as that of their brothers in small families, the families do not invest 
as much into the girls’ education. Finally, girls work less often in families of all sizes, but as 
mentioned earlier we do not have information on domestic work, which girls probably participate 
in more often.  
Further robustness checks 
Table A1 in the appendix uses alternative samples for the estimations on some of the 
investments. The estimation of total school hours is conditional on any school hours, and the 
resulting birth order effects on conditional hours are clearly negative.  The estimations of the 
private school choice and expenses are not conditional on enrollment. The birth order effects in 
these cases are similar to in the estimations on conditional samples, but some of them of a 
slightly smaller magnitude.  
Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix estimate the binary outcomes using the conditional logit model 
and the correlated random effects model. The estimated birth order effects on enrollment differ 
substantially from the linear probability model ones. The conditional logit estimator can only be 
estimated on the subsample of sibhsips with variation in the outcome variable. Given the high 
rates of enrolment this is a minority of sibships, and for these sibships birth order effects are 
clearly positive. The estimated effects in the larger sample are heavily influenced by the zero 
effects in the sample of sibships without any variation in enrolment. Usually this would reduce 
the effect towards zero and we would estimate an effect which could reasonably be claimed to be 
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the average effect in the full sample. However, only large families contribute to the high birth 
order effects and these larger families more often have variation in enrollment. The fact that 
different families contribute unequally to the different birth order effects appears to lead to an 
estimated overall pattern which cannot be found within any given family.8 Even though the 
correlated random effects model also uses the full sample, it appears to work better than the linear 
probability model for enrolment in this respect. The second birth order effect is not statistically 
significant and the higher birth order ones are positive. This only appears to be a significant issue 
with enrollment, however, and not any of the other outcomes. 
6. Potential mechanisms 
Further investigation of the impact of credit constraints 
The positive birth order effects on education which are usually found in developing countries are 
typically explained by credit constraints and rising family income over time. The credit 
constraints model tends to be supported by the heterogeneity of birth order effects across 
socioeconomic groups within developing countries, with positive birth order effects for the poor 
and negative ones, as in a developed country, for the rich. In Tables 5 and 6 we test whether this 
pattern of more negative birth order effects in richer families also holds in India. The tables 
display results of fully interacted models, where household income per capita has been interacted 
with birth orders, the female dummy and the control variables (age fixed effects and survey year). 
To save space, Tables 5 and 6 only report the models estimated on the pooled sample of all 
sibship sizes. Sibship-size-specific estimations are presented in the appendix (Tables A4-A5).   
Birth order effects are indeed more negative in higher income per capita households for 
enrollment, school hours, educational expenses, and completed years. They are more negative 
among the poor for child labor. Birth order effects do not differ significantly between poor and 
rich families for the probability to attend a private school, test scores, and HAZ. Hence we do 
find a difference between poor and rich families for the time investment indicators, for school 
expenses and for completed grades. However, larger effects on expenses among the rich than 
                                                          
8 In particular, the differences in enrollment between higher birth orders are identified only from large families. The 
differences in enrollment between lower birth orders, are, however, heavily influenced by small families, who are 
likely not to have any variation in enrollment at all. The negative coefficient on second-born children mechanically 
makes the difference in enrolment between all birth order go together, but is not actually present in any type of 
family. 
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among the poor is a natural consequence of the fact that richer families afford to spend more.9 
And, among the human capital stock indicators, completed grades is the one which ought to be 
most connected to earlier time investment into education. Furthermore, the sibship-size-specific 
estimations in Table A4-A5 show that the pattern of negative interaction terms for time 
investments do not hold in general across different family sizes. There are few statistically strong 
interaction terms. Those that exist tend to suggest that birth order effects - whether they are 
positive or negative - are weaker in richer families. Smaller families are more often rich and 
larger ones more often poor. The differences between rich and poor families in the pooled sample 
estimations might be driven more by heterogeneous effects across family size and less by 
heterogeneity due to income per se.  
 
Table 5: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on indicators of current human capital stock – coefficients from linear 
sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income per capita 
 Completed 
Grade 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.075 -0.005 0.007 -0.033 -1.934 
Second born -0.198*** -0.188*** -0.191*** -0.173*** -0.369*** 
 (0.012) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) 
Third born -0.351*** -0.281*** -0.251*** -0.301*** -0.712*** 
 (0.021) (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.075) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.409*** -0.337*** -0.362*** -0.392*** -1.075*** 
 (0.032) (0.113) (0.107) (0.102) (0.112) 
Female -0.027*** -0.112*** -0.108*** -0.183*** -0.064** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Second born #  -0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Income per capita (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Third born # Income  -0.001* 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003 
per capita (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Fourth to sixth born # -0.006*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.005 0.002 
Income per capita (0.001) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Female # Income per  0.003*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000 
Capita (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 63,679 7,505 7,423 7,480 29,202 
Sibships 20,624 3,571 3,532 3,559 10,782 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
 
                                                          
9 A regression using the share of school expenses out of total school expenses on the siblings have no statistically 
significant interaction effects (not reported but available from the authors). 
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Table 6: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on educational investment-coefficients from linear sibship fixed 
effects models fully interacted with income per capita 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Mean 0.921 0.082 39.332 0.298 3118.533 
Second born -0.011*** -0.012*** -1.219*** -0.022*** -125.178 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.239) (0.005) (102.234) 
Third born 0.010 -0.038*** -0.518 -0.034*** -218.218 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.414) (0.010) (169.366) 
Fourth to sixth 
born 
0.047*** -0.078*** 0.802 -0.056*** -335.760 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.619) (0.014) (232.470) 
Female -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.984*** -0.055*** -369.923*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.174) (0.004) (60.090) 
Second born # 
Income per capita 
-0.000** 0.001*** -0.007 0.000 -22.385*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (7.553) 
Third born # 
Income per capita 
-0.001*** 0.001*** -0.051*** 0.000 -30.969** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (12.297) 
Fourth to sixth 
born # Income per 
capita 
-0.001*** 0.002*** -0.065** 0.001 -27.140* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (14.609) 
Female # Income 
per capita 
0.000*** -0.000*** 0.009 0.000 -12.634** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (4.928) 
R2 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.20 
N 59,673 63,749 53,572 51,686 46,883 
Sibships 19,798 20,637 18,118 17,856 16,558 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Girls are less disadvantaged in richer than in poorer families on all education related indicators of 
human capital stock. They are as disadvantaged in rich families as in poor ones with regard to 
HAZ. For the investment variables there is a small difference in the effect of being female on 
enrollment and child labor in richer versus poorer families. Girls are as disadvantaged in rich as 
in poor families in terms of the hours they spend on schooling and their probability of attending a 
private school. There is a larger difference in expenses between boys and girls in rich families 
than in poor families, which is due to larger spending on average in rich families.10 
Heterogeneity of birth order effects between rich and poor families did not hold in sibship-size-
specific estimations. Moreover, the birth order gradient is mostly negative also in the poor 
families. This is clearly shown in tables 7 and 8, which restricts the estimation sample to poor 
households in rural areas. The birth order effects on human capital stock indicators are negative 
and at least as large among the rural poor as in the all India sample. The effects on test scores are 
                                                          
10 Again, a regression using the share of school expenses out of total school expenses on the siblings have no 
statistically significant interaction effects (not reported but available from the authors). 
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statistically weaker, but this is probably due to the reduced sample size, since the test scores 
samples are already smaller than samples for other outcomes. The birth order effects on 
educational investments also resemble those in the full sample. There are stronger effects on child 
labor in the rural poor sample, and child labor is also more common in this sample.  
Table 7: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock among the rural poor– coefficients 
from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean -0.204 -0.343 -0.232 -0.398 -2.224 
Second born -0.180*** -0.233** -0.202** -0.213*** -0.433*** 
 (0.028) (0.095) (0.088) (0.082) (0.073) 
Third born -0.338*** -0.318* -0.227 -0.365*** -0.922*** 
 (0.049) (0.168) (0.151) (0.134) (0.125) 
Fourth to 
  
-0.465*** -0.482* -0.425* -0.718*** -1.444*** 
sixth born (0.077) (0.258) (0.218) (0.202) (0.194) 
Female -0.071*** -0.136** -0.079 -0.152*** 0.009 
 (0.018) (0.055) (0.060) (0.053) (0.054) 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 
N 11,807 1,635 1,619 1,630 5,718 
Sibships 4,107 880 871 877 2,344 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship 
fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
 
Table 8: The effect of birth order on educational investment among the rural poor - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Mean 0.896 0.103 35.147 0.089 779.879 
Second born -0.005 -0.027*** -1.043** -0.014* -174.682*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.461) (0.008) (36.893) 
Third born 0.016 -0.039*** -0.941 -0.023* -237.575*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.778) (0.013) (68.466) 
Fourth to sixth 0.040* -0.070*** -1.027 -0.038** -312.414*** 
born (0.024) (0.022) (1.183) (0.019) (108.402) 
Female -0.025*** -0.017*** -0.879*** -0.030*** -99.986*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.308) (0.006) (27.827) 
R2 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.17 
N 10,358 11,828 9,347 8,785 7,836 
Sibships 3,767 4,109 3,431 3,385 3,046 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship 
fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Girls’ disadvantage in comparison to their brothers is also similar to that found in the full sample. 
However, girls face a disadvantage in completed grades among the rural poor, which was not 
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found in the full sample. The disadvantage in HAZ, which was found in the full sample, is not 
found among the rural poor. 
Evaluating the impact of (oldest) son preferences 
We have already shown that girls are clearly disadvantaged within families in India. In this 
section we aim to investigate the interaction of birth order effects and son preferences. We also 
investigate whether oldest son preferences could be one reason behind the mostly negative birth 
order effects, as suggested by Jayachandran and Pande (2015) for early-life outcomes. Since 
earlier  studies from developing countries have not been from countries that exhibit very strong 
son preferences this could be a reason why many birth order effects are negative in India, but 
generally not so in other developing countries. Oldest son preferences could create negative birth 
order effects through two mechanisms. The most straightforward one is that a lower birth order 
increases the probability that a child is the oldest son. Or, to put it differently, a higher birth order 
increases the probability that a child will have to compete over resources with an oldest son. The 
other mechanism works though gender-specific fertility stopping rules. If parents continue to 
have children until they have a certain number of boys, the birth of an additional girl increases 
the expected family size. Note that this last mechanism should primarily affect early life 
investments, which are done before the final family size is known for the lower birth order 
children. Early life investments are, however, likely to affect later life human capital outcomes, 
and thereby also the productivity of later life human capital investments.  
First, to get a general overview of the interaction between gender and birth order we separate 
families where the first-born is a girl from families where the first-born is a boy.11 The gender of 
the first-born should be exogenous in India despite sex-selective abortions since these are not 
common before the birth of the first child (Rosenblum, 2015; Pörtner, 2013). Hence there should 
be no other systematic difference between families where the first-born is a girl compared to 
where the first-born is a boy. If the oldest son is especially favored we should expect large 
negative birth order effects in comparison to him in families with a first-born boy. On the other 
hand we should expect stronger birth order effects in families with first-born girls if gender-
specific stopping rules are an important explanation of negative birth order effects. 
                                                          
11 To get an even more complete picture of how birth order interacts with gender, all birth orders are interacted with a 
girl dummy in Tables A6 to A9 in appendix. These results tell essentially the same story. 
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Tables 9 and 10 present the results for human capital stock indicators in families with first-born 
girls and first-born boys respectively (Tables A10-A11 in the appendix present separate results 
for each sibship size). To compare younger siblings with the first-born we need to take the female 
dummy into account. Doing this, a first-born girl still has a better human capital stock, given her 
age, than any of her younger siblings, whether sisters or brothers. Moreover, in families where 
the first-born is a girl, girls on average have completed more grades than boys given their age. 
Though the oldest sister performs better than younger brothers on test scores, the boys perform 
better than girls of the same birth order. These results are consistent with an impact of gender-
specific stopping rules. If few families aim to have only one child the birth of the first-born girl is 
not likely to have increased expected family size much. However, the birth of additional girls, but 
not boys, increases expected family size, implying lower early life investments for later-born 
girls.  
Similar to first-born girls, first-born boys also have better human capital stock indicators than 
their younger siblings, whether sisters or brothers, but for reading and writing scores the birth 
order effects are not statistically significant. Later-born boys and later-born girls appear to fare 
quite equally in families with first-born boys. The exception is the mathematics score, where 
boys have a statistically significant advantage. This is consistent with prior studies which have 
found that girls in India benefit from having an older brother rather than an older sister 
(Chamarbagwala, 2011), something which could be explained by gender -specific fertility 
stopping rules. However, since there are also negative birth order effects in families with first-
born boys, gender-specific stopping rules is not the sole reason behind the negative birth order 
effects. Negative birth order effects in comparison to the first-born son could depend on 
favoritism towards him, but as shown in table A12 in the appendix, the magnitude of birth order 
effects increases with birth order. High birth order siblings do not only perform worse than the 
first-born son, but also worse than other siblings of a lower birth order than them.  
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Table 9: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families 
with a first-born girl – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
Grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.130 0.017 0.032 -0.013 -1.955 
Second born -0.184*** -0.203*** -0.204*** -0.148*** -0.323*** 
 (0.017) (0.055) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) 
Third born -0.376*** -0.337*** -0.255*** -0.335*** -0.688*** 
 (0.028) (0.096) (0.093) (0.085) (0.095) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.505*** -0.420*** -0.435*** -0.480*** -0.981*** 
 (0.043) (0.150) (0.138) (0.130) (0.145) 
Female 0.022* -0.064* -0.091** -0.128*** -0.049 
 (0.013) (0.037) (0.039) (0.038) (0.035) 
R2 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.05 
N 28,060 3,780 3,735 3,767 13,942 
Sibships 8,627 1,777 1,754 1,770 4,952 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita 
income, and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 10: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in 
families with a first-born boy – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
Grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.078 0.006 0.014 -0.018 -1.919 
Second born -0.218*** -0.082 -0.093* -0.179*** -0.446*** 
 (0.018) (0.057) (0.056) (0.053) (0.059) 
Third born -0.346*** -0.157 -0.169* -0.247*** -0.796*** 
 (0.032) (0.100) (0.099) (0.093) (0.103) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.418*** -0.205 -0.282* -0.322** -1.327*** 
 (0.050) (0.155) (0.148) (0.143) (0.159) 
Female 0.012 -0.068 -0.049 -0.096** -0.063 
 (0.013) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.05 
N 28,687 3,307 3,271 3,299 12,891 
Sibships 9,559 1,578 1,562 1,575 4,888 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita 
income, and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Turning to investment indicators in Tables 11 and 12 (Tables A13-A14 in the appendix present 
separate results for each sibship size), the birth order effects on enrollment are completely 
positive in families with a first-born girl. Birth order effects on school hours are statistically 
insignificant, while birth order effects remain negative on the probability of private schooling and 
on school expenses. While first-born daughters had a higher human capital stock than their 
younger siblings, the families do not invest more in their education. They are less enrolled than 
any of their younger siblings. They are more likely to work than all younger siblings except for a 
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second born brother (who is about as likely to work as she). They spend fewer hours on school 
than at least younger brothers. Conditional on being enrolled they are less likely to attend private 
school than younger brothers, but not sisters. The families spend less on their education than on 
that of younger brothers, but more than on that of younger sisters. If early life investments have 
persisting effects, the fact that first-born girls are favored in human capital stock indicators, but 
not in educational investment would be consistent with gender-specific stopping rules affecting 
early life investments, but parents not fully responding to the human capital advantage that oldest 
daughters possess when deciding on educational investments later in life. Parents still favor later-
born boys.   
In families with a first-born boy the pattern with regard to investment is very similar to that in the 
full sample. For time investments, first-born boys’ higher opportunity cost of schooling imply 
that they are more likely to work than any of their younger siblings. The birth order effects on 
enrollment and on school hours again appear to be non-monotonic (but they are not so for 
specific sibship sizes, in appendix table A14).  When it comes to pecuniary investment into 
school quality, first-born boys are favored in comparison to all of their younger siblings, and in 
particular in comparison to their younger sisters. Conditional on enrollment, they have the highest 
probability of attending a private school. Families spend more on their education than they do on 
that of younger siblings. Among younger siblings boys are favored over girls of the same birth 
order, even if they did not have better human capital stock indicator outcomes.  
Table 11: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families with first-born girls - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private school School expenses 
Mean 0.939 0.062 40.162 0.309 3306.824 
Second born 0.008 -0.015*** -0.340 -0.032*** -506.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.327) (0.007) (97.930) 
Third born 0.025*** -0.042*** 0.196 -0.039*** -607.740*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.559) (0.013) (151.421) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.050*** -0.059*** 1.194 -0.062*** -770.048*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.855) (0.019) (235.582) 
Female -0.008** -0.017*** -0.484** -0.073*** -758.507*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.219) (0.005) (65.750) 
R2 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.14 
N 26,545 28,091 23,845 23,727 21,731 
Sibships 8,349 8,632 7,683 7,813 7,322 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table 12: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families with first-born boys - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private school School expenses 
Mean 0.925 0.080 39.732 0.310 3238.92 
Second born -0.017*** -0.019*** -1.260*** -0.033*** -557.248*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.308) (0.007) (108.346) 
Third born 0.013 -0.051*** -0.400 -0.052*** -835.744*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.537) (0.012) (194.253) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.066*** -0.098*** 1.689** -0.063*** -1,000.624*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.822) (0.019) (278.740) 
Female -0.005 -0.015*** -0.489** -0.035*** -326.922*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.231) (0.005) (60.908) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.17 
N 26,928 28,716 24,099 23,517 21,310 
Sibships 9,198 9,565 8,370 8,358 7,739 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Next, to investigate the role of oldest son preferences we simply add an oldest son dummy (=1 
for the oldest son independent of birth order) to our main regressions in Tables 13 and 14 (Tables 
A15-A16 in the appendix present separate results for each sibship size). By doing this we control 
for one of the two channels though which oldest son preferences could create negative birth order 
effects in all families, whether the first-born is a son or a daughter. The estimated birth order 
effects on human capital stock indicators remain the same. The possible advantage that oldest 
sons have is completely explained by their birth order and gender. The oldest son coefficient is 
both small and statistically insignificant.  In spite of this, oldest sons appear to be favored in 
terms of investment, over and above what can be explained by birth order and gender. Their 
likelihood of working is, however, explained by their birth order and gender. Though the oldest 
son is favored in terms of investment, this does not drive the negative birth order effects. The 
pattern of birth order effects on educational investment is similar to in the main results, but these 
could still be explained by oldest son preferences and the impact that these have on gender-
specific fertility stopping rules.  
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Table 13: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in models with and 
oldest son dummy – coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.076 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -2.053 
Second born -0.200*** -0.144*** -0.130*** -0.147*** -0.176*** 
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.058) 
Third born -0.354*** -0.260*** -0.193*** -0.278*** -0.383*** 
 (0.019) (0.064) (0.063) (0.059) (0.103) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.439*** -0.333*** -0.343*** -0.417*** -0.659*** 
 (0.029) (0.098) (0.092) (0.089) (0.154) 
Oldest son 0.019* -0.053 -0.065* -0.092*** 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.034) (0.034) (0.032) (0.053) 
Female 0.016 -0.009 -0.018 0.047 -0.167*** 
 (0.010) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.052) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.06 
N 69,906 8,509 8,408 8,477 9,779 
Sibships 21,750 3,975 3,929 3,960 4,491 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and sibship 
fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table 14: The effect of birth order on educational investment in models with an oldest son dummy - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 .91489 .08762 38.8296 .2934 3060.11 
Second born -0.023*** 0.002 -1.636*** -0.018*** -313.478*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.186) (0.004) (55.189) 
Third born -0.016*** -0.013** -1.654*** -0.032*** -406.922*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.323) (0.008) (87.528) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.018** -0.049*** -0.399 -0.050*** -476.660*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.491) (0.012) (129.239) 
Oldest son 0.010*** 0.002 0.436** 0.018*** 169.178*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.177) (0.004) (51.567) 
Female -0.007** -0.022*** -0.504*** -0.044*** -420.104*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.181) (0.004) (43.315) 
R2 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.02 0.15 
N 64,847 69,995 58,240 55,847 50,422 
Sibships 20,852 21,765        19,117 18,820 17,438 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy, per capita income, and 
sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
As in Jayachandran and Pande (2015) we have run various regressions where we have interacted 
birth order indicators with indicators of belonging to groups that could be argued to possess 
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stronger or weaker son preferences. For example Hindu (tables A17-A18), Kerala (tables A19-
A20), mothers’ reported desire to have more sons than daughters (tables A21-A22), mothers’ 
education (tables A23-A24), natural regional sex-ratios (tables A25-A26), and a high regional 
score on a ‘standing of women and children’ index (tables A27-A28). Similar to in tables 3 to 4, 
we used fully interacted models. Though some birth order interactions are significant, it is hard to 
find any general patterns. Birth order effects do not seem to be systematically different in places 
where we have reason to expect weaker or stronger son preferences. Being a girl is worse in 
places and families where we should expect stronger son preferences, though. Girls do better in 
comparison to their brothers in non-Hindu families, in Kerala, in families where the mothers do 
not report that they want more sons than daughters, in regions with natural sex ratios, and in 
regions scoring better on the ‘standing of women and children’ index.  
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have investigated the effects of children’s birth order on their stock of and investments into 
human capital. Previous research into the effects of birth order on education human capital has 
revealed negative birth order effects in developed countries and mostly positive effects in 
developing countries. Our results show that birth order effects on human capital stocks are largely 
negative in India, which is in line with the results from developed countries. The results for 
investments into human capital are, however, more mixed. The results for enrollment and child 
labor indicate that later-born children experience an advantage in these measures, which is more 
in line with the results from developing countries. For our other measures of investment, birth 
order effects are again found to be negative. Overall, our results show that the effects of birth 
order on human capital are generally negative in India. They also demonstrate that the type of 
human capital measure examined is important. 
To better understand our results, we have looked into two potential channels: credit constraints 
and son preference. Positive birth order effects in developing countries are typically explained by 
credit constraints. Our results suggest that opportunity cost of child time, which is closely linked 
to credit constraints, matters for time investments. Lower birth order children and boys have a 
higher probability of working. We do not observe household duties, but suspect these to be 
important especially for low birth order girls. The birth order effects on enrollment are non-
monotonous in our main specification. However, this non-monotonicity seems to be the outcome 
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of heterogeneous effects across larger and smaller families rather than of middle born doing 
worse than others within specific families. In large families, where high birth order children are 
observed, the birth order effects on enrollment are positive.  They are insignificant in smaller 
families. Large families also have higher child labor participation rates. This is consistent with 
credit constraints and higher opportunity costs of child time in large families. 
Our results do not indicate that credit constraints are important in general and alone. Birth order 
effects are negative for pecuniary investment into school quality. These investments should also 
be affected by credit constraints, but not by opportunity cost of child time. The birth order 
gradients for pecuniary investments and for indicators of current human capital stock are 
consistently negative. This is true even among the rural poor, where we would expect credit 
constraints to be most important. Household income does not appear to influence the birth order 
effects on pecuniary investment and human capital stocks, except for completed grades, which is 
the human capital stock indicator most closely connected to earlier time investments. Further, 
income does not even appear to influence birth order effects on time investment when we 
condition on sibship size. Income is correlated with family size. Thus, differences in effects by 
family size rather than by income may be driving the differences in birth order effects across rich 
and poor families, in this as well as in other studies from developing countries. 
The negative birth order effects on pecuniary investments could be interpreted as parents 
choosing to invest in the most able children. The return to further education investment is likely 
to be higher for children who already possess more human.  Lower birth order children have 
better HAZ, test scores, and grade completion. This could be interpreted as greater accumulated 
human capital stock. However, these variables are clearly not only measures of the child human 
capital stock, i.e. of the child’s abilities. They are also outcomes of previous human capital 
investments, and there is no reason to assume that abilities should be systematically correlated 
with birth order for natural reasons. Indeed, the developed country evidence suggests that the 
advantage of first-born is not due to biological reasons (Kristensen & Bjerkedal, 2007; Barclay, 
2015b).  
Another reason behind the observed negative birth order effects could be that parents invested 
more in the first-born children in their early life as suggested by Jayachandran and Pande (2015). 
This in turn could be affected by oldest son preference. Oldest son preferences do seem to be able 
33 
 
to explain much of the within-household inequalities in human capital accumulation in our data. 
Boys are favored, earlier birth order children are favored, and oldest sons are especially favored. 
Boys and oldest sons appear to be even more favored than we should expect if it was only a 
rational response to existing differences in abilities. Oldest sons perform well on our human 
capital stock indicators, but not better than what we should expect given them being boys and of 
a low birth order. That is, the birth order and female dummies can fully explain oldest sons’ 
advantage. Still, families invest in oldest sons’ education even more than we should expect given 
their birth order and gender. Moreover, while first-born daughters possess a higher human capital 
stock than all of their younger siblings (as measured by our indicators), the family does not invest 
as much in their education as they do in the education of their younger brothers. This might well 
be due to differences in the perceived returns to parents, if they expect to rely on oldest sons for 
old-age support, rather than being an outcome of pure discrimination. Still, the girls are 
systematically disadvantaged within the families, and oldest sons are systematically favored.  
Gender-specific fertility stopping rules also appear to influence within household inequalities. 
This is most clear in the estimations on subsamples of families where the first-born is a girl 
compared to a boy. In families with a first-born daughter, where the birth of an additional girl 
could increase expected family size if parents keep having children until they have a son, boys 
perform better than girls of the same birth order on human capital stock indicators. In families 
with a first-born son, however, boys and girls of the same birth order perform equally on human 
capital stock indicators. Gender-specific fertility stopping rules combined with a persisting effect 
of early life investments could also explain why first-born daughters perform better than all of 
their younger siblings on human capital stock indicators. In families that aim to have more than 
one child, their birth did not have to increase the expected family size. However, current 
educational investments do not appear to be much affected by gender-specific fertility stopping 
rules and the impact that they had on human capital stock indicators.  
While (oldest) son preferences can explain much of the within household inequalities in human 
capital accumulation in India, they do not appear to be the sole reason behind negative birth order 
effects. We do not find any compelling evidence of stronger negative birth order effects in 
families where we should expect son preferences to be stronger, though boys are more favored in 
these families.  
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An outcome that deviates from the general pattern of son preference is completed grades, where 
all girls (not only first-born) do well in comparison to brothers. In most estimations the female 
dummy does not have a statistically significant coefficient. In families with first-born girls and in 
small families it is positive and statistically significant. We can only speculate as to the reasons, 
but one possibility is that girls are more motivated to perform well at school. They have more 
direct control over the amount of effort they exert, compared with other investments that are 
(mostly) controlled by parents. It could also be related to other non-cognitive skills which girls 
for some reason are better provided with; for example orderliness, time management, diligence, 
responsibility, etc. 
To sum up, birth order effects on education in India broadly follow the same pattern as in 
developed countries. Child opportunity cost of time, however, appears to matter. As a result, birth 
order effects follow the typical developing country pattern for time investments. This is 
especially the case in large families. Oldest son preferences can explain much of the within-
household inequalities which we observe. Policies aimed at changing such preferences could 
therefore reduce within-household inequalities. However, there appear to also be other factors 
creating negative birth order effects. These are probably the same ones which create negative 
birth order effects in developed countries. Pure dilution of parental resources might be one 
explanation. Another possibility is that the disease environment at home is negatively affected by 
more children. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: The effect of birth order and gender on educational investments with alternative 
samples - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Hours 
(sample conditional 
on any hours) 
Private school 
(unconditional 
sample) 
Expenses 
(unconditional 
sample) 
Mean 43.100 0.265 2755.987 
Second born -0.699*** -0.020*** -346.054*** 
 (0.116) (0.004) (47.714) 
Third born -1.228*** -0.031*** -397.253*** 
 (0.212) (0.007) (74.369) 
Fourth to sixth born -1.599*** -0.041*** -365.798*** 
 (0.325) (0.010) (110.820) 
Female -0.110 -0.055*** -515.878*** 
 (0.072) (0.003) (33.708) 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.11 
N 51,279 62,292 56,707 
Sibships        17,569 20,205 18,889 
 
Table A2: The effect of birth order and gender on binary outcome investments – marginal 
effects from the conditional logit model 
 Enrolment Child labor Private school 
Second born 0.039*** -0.067*** -0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) 
Third born 0.086*** -0.113*** -0.058*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.017) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.159*** -0.150*** -0.085*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.026) 
Female -0.057*** -0.047*** -0.146*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
N 12,204 11,619 12,551 
 
Table A3: The effect of birth order and gender on binary outcome investments – coefficients 
from the correlated random effects model 
 Enrolment Child labor Private school 
Second born 0.054 -0.240*** -0.081*** 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.030) 
Third born 0.276*** -0.483*** -0.107** 
 (0.049) (0.044) (0.051) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.560*** -0.749*** -0.116 
 (0.072) (0.065) (0.077) 
Female -0.247*** -0.192*** -0.425*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.023) 
N 60,523 64,647 52,436 
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Table A4: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different sizes – 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.347 0.334 0.360 0.350 -1.760 
Second born -0.235*** -0.121 -0.158 -0.251 -0.519*** 
 (0.025) (0.148) (0.150) (0.165) (0.106) 
Female 0.044*** 0.045 -0.040 -0.126* -0.055 
 (0.017) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.058) 
Second born  
# income 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.002 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Female  
# income 
0.000 0.002 0.004** 0.004* 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
R2 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.05 
N 14,793 1,313 1,289 1,307 6,644 
Sibships 6,431       657       645       654 3,075 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.182 0.136 0.111 0.068 -1.915 
Second born -0.203*** -0.165** -0.105 -0.165* -0.630*** 
 (0.022) (0.079) (0.088) (0.086) (0.082) 
Third born -0.425*** -0.326** -0.034 -0.336** -1.159*** 
 (0.039) (0.147) (0.160) (0.154) (0.145) 
Female 0.013 -0.067 -0.055 -0.105* -0.046 
 (0.015) (0.059) (0.056) (0.057) (0.052) 
Second born -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.008** 
# income (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Third born -0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.014*** 
# income (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
Female 0.002*** 0.006* 0.002 0.005 -0.001 
# income (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R2 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.06 
N 20,167 2,273 2,232 2,253 9,153 
Sibships 6,722 1,106 1,085 1,096 3,459 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean -0.011 -0.031 -0.050 -0.063 -1.991 
Second born -0.189*** -0.328*** -0.469*** -0.279*** -0.594*** 
 (0.031) (0.114) (0.101) (0.098) (0.100) 
Third born -0.408*** -0.378* -0.691*** -0.347** -0.997*** 
 (0.048) (0.206) (0.161) (0.165) (0.168) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.557*** -0.471 -0.866*** -0.464** -1.321*** 
(0.068) (0.315) (0.225) (0.233) (0.246) 
Female -0.062*** -0.203*** -0.164** -0.258*** -0.072 
 (0.021) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.056) 
Second born  0.001 0.012 0.020*** 0.005 0.013*** 
# income (0.002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Third born 0.002 0.004 0.026** -0.004 0.015** 
# income (0.002) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
0.001 -0.006 0.025 -0.021 0.017** 
(0.003) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) 
Female  
# income 
0.004*** 0.011** 0.007 0.009** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.07 0.05 
N 14,466 1,792 1,783 1,797 6,628 
Sibships 4,174 858 855 861 2,270 
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Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean -0.234 -0.270 -0.217 -0.310 -2.047 
Second born -0.180*** -0.264** -0.155 -0.135 -0.126 
 (0.038) (0.126) (0.121) (0.119) (0.127) 
Third born -0.297*** -0.470*** -0.278* -0.386** -0.491*** 
 (0.052) (0.172) (0.162) (0.164) (0.180) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.472*** -0.485** -0.429* -0.575** -0.897*** 
(0.076) (0.232) (0.227) (0.231) (0.263) 
Female -0.111*** -0.129 -0.140* -0.207** -0.174** 
 (0.027) (0.086) (0.081) (0.090) (0.086) 
Second born  0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.014* 
# income (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Third born  -0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.010 
# income (0.003) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
-0.003 -0.008 0.010 0.015 -0.015 
(0.004) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Female 0.005*** 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.010** 
# income (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
R2 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.05 
N 8,858 1,254 1,247 1,249 4,178 
Sibships 2,171 571 569 569 1,267 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean -0.329 -0.451 -0.346 -0.406 -2.116 
Second born -0.135** -0.361* -0.513*** -0.027 0.183 
 (0.060) (0.203) (0.180) (0.180) (0.172) 
Third born -0.236*** -0.299 -0.383 0.147 -0.197 
 (0.073) (0.252) (0.233) (0.221) (0.232) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.230** -0.260 -0.527* 0.182 -0.166 
(0.098) (0.311) (0.287) (0.277) (0.288) 
Female -0.127*** -0.348*** -0.099 -0.239** -0.127*** 
 (0.038) (0.108) (0.106) (0.107) (0.038) 
Second born # income 0.008 0.018 0.039** -0.021 -0.025* 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013) 
Third born # income 0.016** -0.002 -0.004 -0.059** -0.012 
 (0.006) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.014) 
Fourth to sixth born  
# income 
0.008 0.001 0.010 -0.063* -0.022 
(0.007) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.016) 
Female # income 0.008*** 0.021** 0.004 -0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) 
R2 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 
N 5,395 873 872 874 2,599 
Sibships 1,126 379 378 379 711 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed 
effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table A5: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with income 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.972 0.038 43.903 0.404 5248.301 
Second born 0.007 -0.020*** -0.943* -0.027** -79.385 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.555) (0.012) (267.799) 
Female -0.006 0.006 -0.312 -0.038*** -613.430*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.335) (0.008) (163.160) 
Second born # income -0.000*** 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -15.842 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (11.999) 
Female # income 0.000* -0.000*** 0.008 -0.000 1.843 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (9.032) 
R2 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.24 
N 14,397 14,802 12,614 13,227 12,391 
Sibships 6,274 6,435 5,572 5,816 5,483 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.934 0.073 43.398 0.303 3054.367 
Second born -0.006 -0.030*** -1.196*** -0.022** -214.882 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.445) (0.010) (247.163) 
Third born 0.009 -0.056*** -1.257 -0.031 -606.626 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.802) (0.019) (384.176) 
Female -0.018*** -0.004 -0.879*** -0.052*** -230.425** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.306) (0.007) (90.042) 
Second born # income -0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 -32.452* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (18.354) 
Third born # income -0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 -31.924 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.001) (24.293) 
Female # income 0.000* -0.001** 0.006 -0.000 -25.354*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (7.301) 
R2 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.20 
N 19,261 20,186 17,373 16,902 15,453 
Sibships 6,479 6,728 5,973 5,825 5,410 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.898 0.098 41.871 0.248 2087.585 
Second born 0.005 -0.034*** -0.761 -0.044*** -610.295*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.574) (0.013) (172.684) 
Third born 0.019 -0.050*** -0.419 -0.062*** -803.396*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.889) (0.022) (281.523) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.012 -0.056*** -1.339 -0.080*** -1,162.247*** 
(0.022) (0.021) (1.266) (0.031) (424.817) 
Female -0.038*** -0.019*** -1.794*** -0.062*** -303.637*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.391) (0.008) (101.844) 
Second born # income 0.000 0.001* 0.041 0.002** 28.557* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.033) (0.001) (16.779) 
Third born # income -0.000 0.001 0.016 0.003** 14.579 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.047) (0.001) (19.912) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
0.001 0.002 0.062 0.004** 39.487 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.059) (0.001) (25.649) 
Female # income 0.001** -0.001 0.043 0.000 -16.178 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (10.745) 
R2 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.03 0.23 
N 13,464 14,477 12,222 11,342 10,118 
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Sibships 3,963 4,175 3,696 3,513 3,214 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean 0.871 0.124 40.888 0.213 1691.459 
Second born 0.003 -0.048*** -0.540 -0.005 -220.082* 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.776) (0.017) (125.040) 
Third born 0.000 -0.057*** -1.112 -0.022 -555.431*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (1.038) (0.024) (166.714) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.021 -0.078*** -0.850 -0.032 -777.344*** 
(0.026) (0.026) (1.446) (0.035) (279.210) 
Female -0.021** -0.016* -0.653 -0.054*** -357.320*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.514) (0.012) (94.910) 
Second born # income -0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.003** -1.716 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.002) (11.398) 
Third born # income 0.000 0.001 0.018 -0.003* 4.274 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.064) (0.002) (15.714) 
Fourth to sixth born  
# income 
-0.000 0.002 0.042 -0.002 8.627 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.002) (20.849) 
Female # income -0.000 -0.002*** -0.051 -0.001 -17.698* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.038) (0.001) (9.421) 
R2 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.15 
N 7,827 8,880 7,049 6,379 5,618 
Sibships 2,020 2,173 1,871 1,762 1,593 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean 0.861 0.125 40.600 0.212 1561.477 
Second born 0.062** -0.013 1.552 -0.050* -240.872 
 (0.026) (0.023) (1.238) (0.027) (193.468) 
Third born 0.103*** -0.069*** 3.107** -0.035 -315.087 
 (0.028) (0.027) (1.444) (0.031) (250.530) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.109*** -0.071** 2.506 -0.087** -684.888** 
(0.033) (0.033) (1.855) (0.040) (344.046) 
Female -0.040*** -0.019 -1.491** -0.065*** -42.412 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.644) (0.017) (153.355) 
Second born  -0.002 0.001 0.023 0.004 19.033 
# income (0.002) (0.002) (0.093) (0.003) (30.379) 
Third born  -0.003* 0.003 -0.028 0.001 39.081 
# income (0.002) (0.002) (0.103) (0.002) (33.376) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
income 
-0.003 0.003 0.096 0.004 63.075 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.142) (0.003) (43.056) 
Female 0.001* -0.002** -0.002 -0.000 -47.131** 
# income (0.001) (0.001) (0.041) (0.002) (18.350) 
R2 0.21 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.13 
N 4,724 5,404 4,314 3,836 3,303 
Sibships 1,070 1,134 1,016 947 864 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table A6: Birth order effects on human capital indicators in families with first-born girls – coefficients of linear 
sibship fixed effects models with birth order – gender interaction terms 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.130 0.017 0.032 -0.013 -1.955 
Second born -0.201*** -0.143** -0.104* -0.028 -0.270*** 
 (0.017) (0.056) (0.059) (0.056) (0.054) 
Third born -0.397*** -0.244** -0.168* -0.199** -0.647*** 
 (0.030) (0.095) (0.096) (0.089) (0.096) 
Fourth to fifth born -0.541*** -0.389** -0.356** -0.345** -0.929*** 
 (0.045) (0.151) (0.142) (0.136) (0.145) 
Second born # female 0.010 -0.056 -0.110* -0.110** -0.058 
 (0.016) (0.052) (0.056) (0.054) (0.049) 
Third born # female 0.020 -0.128* -0.085 -0.144** -0.032 
 (0.022) (0.067) (0.072) (0.068) (0.062) 
Fourth to sixth born  0.051 0.002 -0.065 -0.142* -0.055 
# female (0.032) (0.087) (0.087) (0.081) (0.081) 
R2 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.05 
N 28,060 3,780 3,735 3,767 13,942 
Sibships 8,627 1,777 1,754 1,770 4,952 
 
Table A7: Birth order effects on educational investment in families with first-born boys – coefficients of linear 
sibship fixed effects models with birth order – gender interaction terms 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.078 0.006 0.014 -0.018 -1.919 
Second born -0.209*** -0.069 -0.081 -0.150*** -0.452*** 
 (0.019) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060) 
Third born -0.355*** -0.179* -0.171 -0.267*** -0.757*** 
 (0.034) (0.104) (0.105) (0.100) (0.106) 
Fourth to fifth born -0.428*** -0.205 -0.299* -0.351** -1.381*** 
(0.053) (0.165) (0.158) (0.147) (0.171) 
Second born # female -0.006 -0.095 -0.070 -0.151*** -0.053 
(0.016) (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.052) 
Third born # female 0.030 -0.024 -0.040 -0.053 -0.145* 
(0.024) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079) (0.074) 
Fourth to sixth born # 
female 
0.030 -0.067 -0.010 -0.028 0.037 
(0.035) (0.105) (0.103) (0.098) (0.102) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.05 
N 28,687 3,307 3,271 3,299 12,891 
Sibships 9,559 1,578 1,562 1,575 4,888 
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Table A8 Birth order effects on human capital indicators in families with first-born boys – coefficients of 
linear sibship fixed effects models with birth order – gender interaction terms 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private 
school 
School  
expenses 
Mean 0.939 0.062 40.162 0.309 3306.824 
Second born 0.017*** 0.003 0.208 0.038*** 284.697*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.331) (0.008) (100.998) 
Third born 0.028*** -0.023** 0.589 0.039*** 138.522 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.568) (0.013) (150.040) 
Fourth to  fifth born 0.060*** -0.048*** 1.668* 0.008 -85.881 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.862) (0.020) (233.973) 
Second born # female -0.011** -0.018*** -0.624** -0.067*** -832.471*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.304) (0.007) (101.269) 
Third born # female 0.002 -0.022*** -0.295 -0.085*** -745.783*** 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.389) (0.009) (108.074) 
Fourth to sixth 
born # female 
-0.013* -0.005 -0.455 -0.066*** -605.388*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.517) (0.012) (140.925) 
R2 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.14 
N 26,545 28,091 23,845 23,727 21,731 
Sibships 8,349 8,632 7,683 7,813 7,322 
 
Table A9: Birth order effects on educational investment in families with first-born boys – coefficients of 
linear sibship fixed effects models with birth order – gender interaction terms 
 Enrollment Child labor Total hours Private 
school 
School 
expenses 
Mean .925 .080 39.732 .310 3238.92 
Second born -0.019*** -0.019*** -1.384*** -0.036*** -549.056*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.320) (0.007) (108.944) 
Third born 0.015 -0.051*** -0.328 -0.048*** -874.521*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.568) (0.013) (206.218) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.068*** -0.097*** 1.979** -0.059*** -945.944*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.892) (0.020) (283.326) 
Second born #female -0.001 -0.014*** -0.224 -0.029*** -342.246*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.310) (0.007) (87.543) 
Third born #female -0.010 -0.015* -0.611 -0.043*** -242.857** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.439) (0.009) (104.778) 
Fourth to sixth  -0.008 -0.017 -1.067* -0.042*** -431.639*** 
born #female (0.011) (0.010) (0.614) (0.014) (120.368) 
R2 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.17 
N 26,928 28,716 24,099 23,517 21,310 
Sibships 9,198 9,565 8,370 8,358 7,739 
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Table A10: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different 
sizes with first-born girls– coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.385 0.339 0.347 0.347 -1.818 
Second born -0.278*** -0.201 -0.254 -0.210 -0.308* 
 (0.042) (0.174) (0.201) (0.184) (0.173) 
Female 0.026 0.171 0.070 0.075 0.088 
 (0.033) (0.129) (0.136) (0.139) (0.134) 
R2 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.05 
N 5,994 504 492 500 2,638 
Sibships 2,585 252 246 250 1,217 
Panel II: 3 child families 
Mean 0.229 0.200 0.160 0.128 -1.922 
Second born -0.209*** -0.161 -0.276** -0.255** -0.531*** 
 (0.027) (0.114) (0.123) (0.116) (0.088) 
Third born -0.517*** -0.280 -0.364* -0.594*** -0.965*** 
 (0.047) (0.218) (0.216) (0.202) (0.157) 
Female 0.019 0.006 -0.080 -0.029 -0.093 
 (0.019) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.061) 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.05 
N 9,230 1,125 1,101 1,115 4,534 
Sibships 2,983 542 530 537 1,688 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.050 0.015 0.040 0.004 -1.963 
Second born -0.160*** -0.378*** -0.321*** -0.077 -0.354*** 
 (0.034) (0.103) (0.122) (0.104) (0.094) 
Third born -0.408*** -0.629*** -0.439** -0.246 -0.718*** 
 (0.060) (0.174) (0.196) (0.170) (0.156) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.669*** -1.001*** -0.636** -0.494** -0.870*** 
(0.087) (0.262) (0.288) (0.248) (0.244) 
Female -0.016 -0.097 -0.082 -0.118 -0.021 
 (0.024) (0.062) (0.076) (0.073) (0.064) 
R2 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.06 
N 6,851 1,018 1,008 1,017 3,553 
Sibships 1,838 484 479 484 1,174 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean -0.165 -0.222 -0.168 -0.273 -2.137 
Second born -0.055 -0.230* -0.138 -0.058 -0.148 
 (0.045) (0.129) (0.134) (0.123) (0.122) 
Third born -0.217*** -0.499** -0.186 -0.289 -0.705*** 
 (0.074) (0.195) (0.197) (0.195) (0.185) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.458*** -0.425 -0.333 -0.284 -1.086*** 
(0.111) (0.283) (0.277) (0.293) (0.285) 
Female -0.055 -0.059 -0.032 -0.202** -0.119 
 (0.034) (0.096) (0.095) (0.092) (0.087) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.08 
N 3,942 698 695 696 2,098 
Sibships 864 316 315 315 599 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean -0.230 -0.445 -0.345 -0.405 -2.041 
Second born 0.020 -0.245 -0.292 -0.041 -0.002 
 (0.067) (0.208) (0.188) (0.159) (0.179) 
Third born -0.082 -0.321 -0.454** -0.160 -0.094 
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 (0.084) (0.251) (0.218) (0.176) (0.294) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.197* -0.194 -0.475* -0.283 -0.214 
(0.116) (0.331) (0.267) (0.247) (0.414) 
Female -0.076 -0.242** -0.152 -0.369*** -0.006 
 (0.051) (0.117) (0.104) (0.103) (0.128) 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 
N 2,043 435 439 439 1,119 
Sibships 357 183 184 184 274 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table A11: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different 
sizes with first-born boys– coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.323 0.331 0.378 0.356 -1.700 
Second born -0.211*** -0.055 -0.171 -0.168 -0.486*** 
 (0.029) (0.148) (0.144) (0.163) (0.094) 
Female 0.012 0.092 0.070 -0.011 -0.077 
 (0.025) (0.092) (0.098) (0.094) (0.080) 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.05 
N 8,930 817 805 815 4,092 
Sibships 3,873 408 402 407 1,891 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.154 0.075 0.054 0.017 -1.918 
Second born -0.210*** -0.207** 0.011 -0.126 -0.542*** 
 (0.031) (0.088) (0.099) (0.092) (0.097) 
Third born -0.401*** -0.275** 0.130 -0.175 -0.961*** 
 (0.053) (0.139) (0.172) (0.151) (0.171) 
Female 0.026 0.045 -0.040 -0.026 -0.066 
 (0.020) (0.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.064) 
R2 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.07 
N 9,956 1,136 1,118 1,128 4,332 
Sibships 3,259 552 543 548 1,609 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean -0.097 -0.101 -0.178 -0.162 -2.107 
Second born -0.440*** -0.071 -0.191** -0.305** -0.515*** 
 (0.096) (0.134) (0.080) (0.125) (0.165) 
Third born -0.784*** 0.039 -0.351*** -0.283 -0.951*** 
 (0.152) (0.172) (0.121) (0.203) (0.277) 
Fourth to sixth born -1.125*** 0.125 -0.471*** -0.453 -1.461*** 
(0.216) (0.218) (0.164) (0.280) (0.396) 
Female 0.001 -0.101 -0.042 -0.157* -0.242*** 
 (0.058) (0.118) (0.065) (0.086) (0.091) 
R2 0.66 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.07 
N 5,424 683 682 688 2,371 
Sibships 1,502 325 326 328   802 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean -0.334 -0.316 -.0237 -0.330 -2.080 
Second born -0.300*** -0.295 -0.200 -0.370** -0.787*** 
 (0.063) (0.195) (0.177) (0.182) (0.212) 
Third born -0.405*** -0.486* -0.206 -0.618** -0.923*** 
 (0.088) (0.283) (0.253) (0.261) (0.273) 
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Fourth to sixth born -0.640*** -0.809** -0.191 -0.787** -1.511*** 
(0.126) (0.371) (0.339) (0.365) (0.418) 
Female -0.026 -0.273** -0.098 -0.229** 0.214 
 (0.041) (0.114) (0.116) (0.109) (0.132) 
R2 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.04 
N 2,792 410 407 407 1,287 
Sibships 633 181 180 180 374 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean -0.445 -0.525 -0.387 -0.477 -2.233 
Second born -0.169** -0.174 -0.513** -0.316 -0.060 
 (0.079) (0.258) (0.248) (0.249) (0.249) 
Third born -0.152 -0.179 -0.538 -0.283 -0.633** 
 (0.113) (0.312) (0.344) (0.298) (0.302) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.134 0.028 -0.386 -0.110 -0.536 
(0.157) (0.413) (0.444) (0.387) (0.363) 
Female 0.007 -0.264* 0.054 -0.080 -0.029 
 (0.052) (0.155) (0.144) (0.124) (0.157) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.08 
N 1,585 261 259 261 809 
Sibships 292 112 111 112 212 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table A12: The effect of birth order between later-born siblings on human capital stock indicators and 
educational investment in families with first-born boys - comparison of coefficients in Tables 10 and 12 
Panel A: Human capital stock indicators 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Third born minus 
second born 
-0.128*** -0.076 -0.075 -0.068 -0.423*** 
(0.019) (0.063) (0.063) (0.060) (0.108) 
Fourth to sixth born 
minus second born 
-0.201*** -0.123 -0.189* -0.143 -1.202*** 
(0.038) (0.118) (0.114) (0.110) (0.208) 
Panel B: Educational investment 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Third born minus 
second born 
0.029*** -0.032*** 0.822** -0.019*** -291.576*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.327) (0.007) (103.847) 
Fourth to sixth born 
minus second born 
0.082*** -0.076*** 3.000*** -0.030** -459.998** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.625) (0.014) (190.424) 
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Table A13: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes with first-born 
girls- coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.973 0.028 45.278 0.412 5519.259 
Second born -0.008 0.002 -2.002* -0.038** -636.782* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (1.041) (0.018) (368.238) 
Female 0.001 0.016** -0.456 -0.067*** -1,031.280*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.701) (0.015) (291.887) 
R2 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.17 
N 5,835 5,996 5,129 5,371 5,090 
Sibships 2,520 2,586 2,256 2,339 2,231 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.949 0.060 43.813 0.325 3438.653 
Second born -0.005 -0.010 -1.231** -0.035*** -897.986*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.543) (0.014) (208.621) 
Third born -0.002 -0.037*** -1.854* -0.058** -1,351.707*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.986) (0.024) (333.093) 
Female -0.010* -0.005 -0.972*** -0.079*** -935.277*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.374) (0.009) (124.055) 
R2 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.16 
N 8,876 9,241 8,002 7,972 7,334 
Sibships 2,888 2,987 2,671 2,692 2,512 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.926 0.070 41.858   0.266   2257.038 
Second born 0.036*** -0.022** 1.071 -0.007 -418.786*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.670) (0.014) (149.301) 
Third born 0.037* -0.033* 0.770 0.015 -619.161** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (1.093) (0.023) (261.371) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.036 -0.016 0.601 0.016 -539.489 
(0.029) (0.026) (1.629) (0.033) (371.485) 
Female -0.022*** -0.016** -0.884** -0.068*** -683.435*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.400) (0.010) (91.571) 
R2 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.21 
N 6,429 6,856 5,799 5,700 5,144 
Sibships 1,760 1,838 1,641 1,661 1,545 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean 0.903 0.088 40.806 0.226 1770.209 
Second born 0.039** -0.057*** 1.359 -0.050** -308.370* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.865) (0.020) (165.151) 
Third born 0.045** -0.071*** 1.648 -0.088*** -782.916*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (1.192) (0.033) (189.455) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.060** -0.084** 2.298 -0.118** -1,108.808*** 
(0.028) (0.033) (1.749) (0.051) (288.530) 
Female -0.029*** -0.015 -1.535*** -0.079*** -588.131*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.567) (0.015) (144.528) 
R2 0.19 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.09 
N 3,549 3,954 3,217 3,077 2,749 
Sibships 827 864 777 779 719 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean 0.893 0.095 39.760 0.204 1465.327 
Second born 0.098*** -0.020 3.821** -0.042 -208.427 
 (0.029) (0.025) (1.490) (0.026) (214.284) 
Third born 0.139*** -0.067** 5.674*** -0.044 -117.510 
 (0.033) (0.030) (2.028) (0.036) (401.187) 
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Fourth to sixth born 0.113*** -0.050 4.476 -0.062 -352.354 
(0.039) (0.037) (2.805) (0.046) (605.080) 
Female -0.020 -0.031** -0.699 -0.062*** -450.213*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.856) (0.019) (169.514) 
R2 0.25 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.10 
N 1,856 2,044 1,698 1,607 1,414 
Sibships 354 357 338 342 315 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table A14: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes with first-born 
boys- coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.971 0.044 45.275 0.400 5052.324 
Second born 0.005 -0.022*** -0.374 -0.039*** -562.128*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.540) (0.013) (189.672) 
Female 0.002 0.005 -0.328 -0.020* -516.610*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.426) (0.011) (171.627) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.23 
N 8,695 8,937 7,598 7,985 7,418 
Sibships 3,782 3,876 3,343 3,504 3,277 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.928 0.079 43.029 0.288 2714.479 
Second born -0.013 -0.046*** -1.040* -0.026** -784.975*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.539) (0.012) (232.587) 
Third born -0.000 -0.063*** -0.988 -0.019 -1,229.601*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.936) (0.022) (420.099) 
Female -0.002 -0.003 -0.309 -0.030*** -280.939*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.360) (0.008) (102.470) 
R2 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.16 
N 9,489 9,963 8,584 8,299 7,565 
Sibships 3,142 3,261 2,904 2,811 2,612 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.890 0.105 41.607 0.244 1917.89 
Second born -0.010 -0.056*** -0.922 -0.061*** -686.265*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.775) (0.019) (240.216) 
Third born 0.026 -0.082*** 0.448 -0.091*** -1,368.515*** 
 (0.020) (0.019) (1.157) (0.029) (481.070) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.032 -0.088*** 0.501 -0.112*** -1,533.597** 
(0.028) (0.027) (1.616) (0.042) (663.997) 
Female -0.017* -0.017* -1.187** -0.044*** -207.731* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.528) (0.012) (107.618) 
R2 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.14 
N 4,992 5,429 4,533 4,184 3,694 
Sibships 1,415 1,503 1,316 1,267 1,147 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean 0.854 0.128 40.683 0.217 1540.845 
Second born -0.019 -0.049** -1.731 -0.075*** -182.360 
 (0.024) (0.023) (1.212) (0.026) (136.445) 
Third born 0.014 -0.067** -2.014 -0.098*** -246.116 
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 (0.031) (0.030) (1.587) (0.035) (196.377) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.045 -0.066 -0.996 -0.104** -245.699 
(0.043) (0.040) (2.219) (0.050) (301.610) 
Female -0.018 -0.021 -0.589 -0.024 -475.003*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.745) (0.015) (113.229) 
R2 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.19 
N 2,412 2,797 2,161 1,937 1,699 
Sibships 584 633 544 518 466 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean 0.872 0.117 40.446 0.238 1397.874 
Second born 0.004 -0.057* -0.734 0.005 106.355 
 (0.036) (0.032) (1.665) (0.040) (203.631) 
Third born 0.076* -0.108*** 2.638 -0.017 45.898 
 (0.040) (0.039) (1.957) (0.048) (264.656) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.071 -0.096* 1.883 -0.023 186.412 
(0.052) (0.049) (2.562) (0.058) (403.862) 
Female -0.010 -0.047*** -0.595 -0.072*** -192.325** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.860) (0.025) (97.501) 
R2 0.18 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.25 
N 1,340 1,590 1,223 1,112 934 
Sibships 275 292 263 258 237 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table A15: The effect of birth order on indicators of current human capital stock in families of different 
sizes– coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects estimations with an oldest son dummy 
 Completed 
grades 
Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.348 0.334 0.366 0.352 -1.751 
Second born -0.253*** -0.144 -0.203* -0.230* -0.393** 
 (0.021) (0.103) (0.113) (0.123) (0.169) 
Oldest son 0.005 0.099 0.068 0.007 -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.089) (0.095) (0.092) (0.126) 
Female -0.048** 0.005 0.004 0.053 -0.210 
 (0.021) (0.075) (0.080) (0.076) (0.150) 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.05 
N 15,048 1,332 1,308 1,326 1,430 
Sibships 6,509 665 653 662 714 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.184 0.136 0.106 0.074 -2.004 
Second born -0.385*** -0.223*** -0.078 -0.147** -0.535*** 
 (0.037) (0.085) (0.048) (0.066) (0.137) 
Third born -0.837*** -0.357** -0.064 -0.302*** -1.052*** 
 (0.067) (0.157) (0.088) (0.116) (0.260) 
Oldest son -0.053* 0.060 -0.045 0.065 -0.004 
 (0.032) (0.074) (0.038) (0.055) (0.091) 
Female 0.054* 0.044 -0.056 -0.005 -0.194** 
 (0.032) (0.082) (0.040) (0.057) (0.097) 
R2 0.80 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.12 
N 20,466 2,318 2,274 2,298 2,596 
Sibships 6,789 1,122 1,100 1,112 1,249 
Panel III: 4-child families 
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Mean -0.012 -0.030 -0.046 -0.060 -2.057 
Second born -0.161*** -0.226** -0.297*** -0.210** -0.497*** 
 (0.025) (0.094) (0.082) (0.082) (0.119) 
Third born -0.356*** -0.357** -0.451*** -0.345** -0.951*** 
 (0.042) (0.170) (0.129) (0.141) (0.195) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.516*** -0.553** -0.631*** -0.635*** -1.245*** 
(0.061) (0.257) (0.183) (0.204) (0.276) 
Oldest son 0.002 -0.067 -0.071 -0.126* -0.094 
 (0.021) (0.065) (0.074) (0.068) (0.124) 
Female 0.030 0.038 0.041 0.068 -0.150 
 (0.022) (0.067) (0.078) (0.070) (0.106) 
R2 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.08 
N 14,617 1,818 1,809 1,822 2,074 
Sibships 4,206 866 863 869 972 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean -0.237 -0.272 -0.219 -0.308 -2.167 
Second born -0.133*** -0.262*** -0.170* -0.143 -0.205 
 (0.033) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.183) 
Third born -0.268*** -0.509*** -0.250* -0.384*** -0.657** 
 (0.047) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.298) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.455*** -0.535*** -0.321 -0.441** -1.122** 
(0.067) (0.199) (0.195) (0.206) (0.454) 
Oldest son -0.022 -0.130 -0.031 -0.174** 0.102 
 (0.028) (0.084) (0.079) (0.078) (0.154) 
Female 0.087*** -0.049 0.078 0.027 -0.179 
 (0.032) (0.092) (0.084) (0.090) (0.155) 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 8,979 1,271 1,264 1,266 1,538 
Sibships 2,191 576 574 574 687 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean -0.326 -0.456 -0.350 -0.413 -2.211 
Second born -0.044 -0.232 -0.288** -0.103 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.156) (0.141) (0.127) (0.215) 
Third born -0.069 -0.253 -0.356** -0.103 -0.269 
 (0.063) (0.180) (0.164) (0.140) (0.278) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.102 -0.175 -0.411** -0.151 -0.466 
(0.085) (0.227) (0.197) (0.175) (0.381) 
Oldest son 0.006 -0.142 -0.036 -0.153* -0.042 
 (0.034) (0.091) (0.086) (0.078) (0.198) 
Female 0.187*** 0.142 0.147 0.221** -0.234 
 (0.046) (0.119) (0.110) (0.107) (0.159) 
R2 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 
N 5,467 889 889 891 1,040 
Sibships 1,134 381 380 381 430 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
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Table A16: The effect of birth order on educational investment in families of different sizes - coefficients 
from linear sibship fixed effects estimations with an oldest son dummy 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Panel I: 2-child families 
Mean 0.972 0.038 43.903 0.404 5248.301 
Second born 0.002 -0.013** -1.046** -0.023** -448.988*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.449) (0.010) (166.309) 
Oldest son 0.004 0.010* -0.265 0.010 -62.131 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.346) (0.009) (137.629) 
Female 0.002 0.010 -0.430 -0.029*** -616.878*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.421) (0.011) (168.914) 
R2 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.19 
N 14,651 15,057 12,839 13,467 12,617 
Sibships 6,353 6,513 5,647 5,890 5,554 
Panel II: 3-child families 
Mean 0.935 0.074 40.379 0.304 3087.83 
Second born -0.006 -0.020*** -1.026*** -0.009 -604.595*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.354) (0.008) (135.299) 
Third born 0.007 -0.039*** -1.102* -0.010 -962.532*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.648) (0.015) (247.656) 
Oldest son 0.008 0.019*** 0.329 0.032*** 290.116*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.304) (0.007) (99.485) 
Female -0.005 0.000 -0.471 -0.034*** -367.193*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.311) (0.007) (84.450) 
R2 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.15 
N 19,549 20,485 17,628 17,157 15,690 
Sibships 6,544 6,795 6,035 5,884 5,470 
Panel III: 4-child families 
Mean 0.900 0.098 37.289 0.250 2096.006 
Second born 0.011 -0.025*** -0.123 -0.024** -329.271*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.474) (0.010) (120.462) 
Third born 0.026* -0.041*** 0.191 -0.030* -657.090*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.750) (0.018) (230.125) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.028 -0.042** -0.071 -0.040 -616.597* 
(0.020) (0.017) (1.091) (0.025) (326.889) 
Oldest son  0.008 0.008 0.501 0.009 181.117** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.416) (0.009) (80.417) 
Female -0.020*** -0.022*** -1.016** -0.056*** -377.882*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.400) (0.009) (75.503) 
R2 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.17 
N 13,600 14,628 12,345 11,461 10,224 
Sibships 3,991 4,207 3,720 3,539 3,237 
Panel IV: 5-child families 
Mean 0.871 0.124 35.219 0.215 1686.569 
Second born 0.003 -0.040*** -0.378 -0.029** -228.422* 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.661) (0.014) (120.517) 
Third born 0.008 -0.049*** -0.732 -0.053** -494.588*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.868) (0.021) (134.774) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.028 -0.060*** -0.020 -0.055* -648.762*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (1.228) (0.031) (194.959) 
Oldest son 0.012 0.019* 0.670 0.058*** 241.660** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.588) (0.013) (116.290) 
Female -0.017* -0.025*** -0.746 -0.028*** -420.888*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.511) (0.011) (89.281) 
R2 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.03 0.11 
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N 7,931 9,001 7,145 6,464 5,696 
Sibships 2,040 2,193 1,891 1,781 1,611 
Panel V: 6-child families 
Mean 0.860 0.125 34.409 0.212 1551.217 
Second born 0.061*** -0.013 1.981* -0.028 -129.539 
 (0.022) (0.019) (1.060) (0.022) (127.022) 
Third born 0.097*** -0.057** 3.297*** -0.034 -69.918 
 (0.024) (0.023) (1.263) (0.027) (212.445) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.110*** -0.054** 3.828** -0.052 -163.590 
(0.028) (0.027) (1.553) (0.033) (297.630) 
Oldest son 0.032** 0.020 1.810** 0.007 -79.952 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.804) (0.018) (206.954) 
Female -0.015 -0.029** -0.778 -0.067*** -515.221*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.605) (0.014) (148.298) 
R2 0.20 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.08 
N 4,792 5,476 4,369 3,887 3,344 
Sibships 1,070 1,134 1,016 947 864 
Note: The estimations also include a constant, a full set of child age dummies, a year dummy and sibship fixed effects.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors, clustered at the sibship level, within parenthesis. 
 
Table A17: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in Hindu versus other families - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with Hindu dummy 
 Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
 0.076 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -1.934 
Second born  -0.192*** -0.219*** -0.261*** -0.259*** -0.325*** 
 (0.022) (0.072) (0.080) (0.065) (0.076) 
Third born -0.324*** -0.307** -0.302** -0.372*** -0.717*** 
 (0.038) (0.122) (0.140) (0.111) (0.135) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.420*** -0.465** -0.539** -0.639*** -1.190*** 
 (0.058) (0.186) (0.211) (0.177) (0.214) 
Female 0.053*** -0.024 -0.061 -0.069 -0.026 
 (0.016) (0.050) (0.057) (0.046) (0.048) 
Second born # Hindu -0.017 0.098 0.168* 0.128* -0.024 
 (0.025) (0.081) (0.089) (0.075) (0.083) 
Third born # Hindu -0.050 0.074 0.140 0.099 0.054 
 (0.042) (0.140) (0.155) (0.129) (0.148) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# Hindu 
-0.038 0.193 0.244 0.250 0.178 
 (0.065) (0.213) (0.232) (0.202) (0.232) 
Female # Hindu -0.058*** -0.024 0.014 -0.067 -0.041 
 (0.018) (0.056) (0.063) (0.053) (0.053) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 64,577 7,628 7,544 7,603 29,647 
Sibships 20,829 3,610 3,570 3,598 10,898 
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Table A18: Birth order effects on educational investment in Hindu versus other families - coefficients from 
linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with Hindu dummy 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 0.921 0.082 39.351 0.300 3171.878 
Second born  -0.012 -0.009 -1.099*** -0.018* -316.829*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.420) (0.010) (120.961) 
Third born 0.004 -0.021* -0.956 -0.035** -497.895** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.717) (0.016) (212.904) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.060*** -0.048*** 0.776 -0.042* -711.895** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (1.122) (0.025) (300.809) 
Female -0.007 -0.037*** -0.216 -0.042*** -497.629*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.289) (0.007) (80.675) 
Second born # Hindu -0.004 0.005 -0.280 -0.002 -115.390 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.470) (0.011) (136.850) 
Third born # Hindu -0.002 -0.009 -0.036 0.003 -102.164 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.813) (0.018) (235.119) 
Fourth to sixth born  
# Hindu 
-0.025 -0.020 -0.425 -0.011 18.403 
 (0.021) (0.020) (1.271) (0.028) (335.446) 
Female # Hindu -0.010* 0.021*** -0.764** -0.018** -66.287 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.325) (0.008) (91.961) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.15 
N 60,523 64,647 54,326 52,436 47,571 
Sibships 19,998 20,842 18,309 18,041 16,736 
 
Table A19: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in Kerala versus the rest of India - 
coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with Kerala dummy 
 Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
 0.076 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -1.934 
Second born  -0.205*** -0.142*** -0.128*** -0.154*** -0.342*** 
 (0.011) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Third born -0.364*** -0.256*** -0.190*** -0.293*** -0.659*** 
 (0.019) (0.063) (0.062) (0.058) (0.061) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.457*** -0.326*** -0.343*** -0.431*** -1.026*** 
 (0.029) (0.098) (0.091) (0.088) (0.094) 
Female 0.006 -0.051** -0.056** -0.131*** -0.059*** 
 (0.007) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) 
Second born #Kerala 0.086 -0.067 0.172 -0.156 -0.200 
 (0.071) (0.228) (0.295) (0.324) (0.291) 
Third born # Kerala 0.041 -0.196 0.149 -0.110 -0.629 
 (0.140) (0.507) (0.561) (0.678) (0.569) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# Kerala 
0.078 0.411 2.887*** -0.326 -1.070 
 (0.226) (0.554) (0.765) (0.776) (0.881) 
Female # Kerala 0.102** 0.269** 0.385** 0.348* -0.010 
 (0.043) (0.127) (0.177) (0.190) (0.110) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 64,577 7,628 7,544 7,603 29,647 
Sibships 20,829 3,610 3,570 3,598 10,898 
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Table A20: Birth order effects on educational investment in Kerala versus the rest of India - coefficients 
from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with Kerala dummy 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 0.921 0.082 39.351 0.300 3171.878 
Second born  -0.015*** -0.006* -1.286*** -0.020*** -408.652*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.197) (0.005) (62.693) 
Third born 0.002 -0.028*** -0.951*** -0.033*** -574.428*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.351) (0.008) (106.657) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.039*** -0.062*** 0.433 -0.049*** -682.090*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.539) (0.012) (160.236) 
Female -0.015*** -0.021*** -0.831*** -0.057*** -563.740*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.132) (0.003) (39.614) 
Second born #Kerala 0.022*** -0.002 0.355 -0.010 -228.928 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.765) (0.029) (234.283) 
Third born # Kerala 0.002 0.022** -2.127 -0.052 -488.848 
 (0.013) (0.010) (1.510) (0.053) (444.188) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# Kerala 
-0.025** 0.059*** -2.908 -0.078 -1,121.236 
 (0.013) (0.013) (2.108) (0.088) (728.649) 
Female # Kerala 0.013* 0.028*** 0.619 0.053*** 479.822*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.588) (0.018) (160.845) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.15 
N 60,523 64,647 54,326 52,436 47,571 
Sibships 19,998 20,842 18,309 18,041 16,736 
 
Table A21: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in families where the mother does and 
does not express son preference - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with 
a son preference dummy1 
 Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
 0.092 0.027 0.042 0.005 -1.924 
Second born  -0.191*** -0.164*** -0.062 -0.143*** -0.340*** 
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) 
Third born -0.336*** -0.243*** -0.101 -0.247*** -0.651*** 
 (0.025) (0.085) (0.087) (0.082) (0.087) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.401*** -0.406*** -0.240* -0.431*** -1.023*** 
 (0.039) (0.131) (0.133) (0.129) (0.129) 
Female 0.023** 0.019 0.027 -0.061* -0.054** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.027) 
Second born # prefer 
sons 
-0.032 0.071 -0.050 0.051 -0.051 
(0.028) (0.092) (0.091) (0.084) (0.091) 
Third born # prefer 
sons 
-0.095* 0.042 -0.068 0.081 -0.153 
(0.049) (0.161) (0.156) (0.137) (0.157) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# prefer sons 
-0.150* 0.289 -0.069 0.084 -0.151 
(0.079) (0.251) (0.226) (0.208) (0.240) 
Female # prefer sons -0.051*** -0.087 -0.173*** -0.137** -0.055 
 (0.019) (0.064) (0.062) (0.059) (0.057) 
R2 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.04 
N 49,044 5,581 5,523 5,563 22,640 
Sibships 16,428 2,666 2,637 2,657 8,532 
1 The son preference dummy is 1 if the mother states a higher number of desired boys than girls. 
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Table A22: Birth order effects on education investment in families where the mother does and does not 
express son preference - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with a son 
preference dummy1 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 0.926 0.078 39.750 0.311 3328.355 
Second born  -0.015*** -0.005 -1.324*** -0.019*** -354.370*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.263) (0.006) (75.162) 
Third born 0.002 -0.030*** -0.795 -0.025** -444.966*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.487) (0.011) (129.672) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.044*** -0.062*** 1.013 -0.028* -470.800** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.749) (0.017) (198.503) 
Female -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.386** -0.055*** -571.126*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.167) (0.004) (54.223) 
Second born # prefer 
sons 
0.006 -0.013 0.458 0.003 24.274 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.523) (0.012) (128.811) 
Third born # prefer 
sons 
-0.007 0.004 -0.485 -0.008 -124.931 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.900) (0.021) (222.575) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# prefer sons 
-0.032 -0.002 -1.788 -0.038 -111.996 
(0.024) (0.024) (1.398) (0.032) (328.769) 
Female # prefer sons -0.018*** -0.002 -1.056*** -0.001 -22.805 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.344) (0.008) (93.145) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.16 
N 46,025 49,089 41,250 40,058 36,517 
Sibships 15,750 16,437 14,386 14,220 13,217 
1 The son preference dummy is 1 if the mother states a higher number of desired boys than girls. 
 
Table A23: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on current human capital indicators depending on 
mothers’ education - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with mothers’ 
education in years 
 Grades Reading Writing Mathematics HAZ 
 0.0760 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -1.933 
Second born  -0.159*** -0.202*** -0.199*** -0.179*** -0.333*** 
 (0.014) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
Third born -0.311*** -0.298*** -0.219*** -0.285*** -0.662*** 
 (0.024) (0.078) (0.078) (0.072) (0.075) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.404*** -0.434*** -0.367*** -0.469*** -0.969*** 
 (0.037) (0.117) (0.114) (0.109) (0.116) 
Female -0.047*** -0.122*** -0.090*** -0.194*** -0.051* 
 (0.010) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) 
Second born  
#mothers’ education 
-0.004** 0.013* 0.010 0.003 -0.006 
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Third born  
#mothers’ education 
-0.010*** 0.011 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Fourth to sixth born 
#mothers’ education 
-0.023*** 0.038* 0.007 0.011 -0.027 
(0.006) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) 
Female # mothers’ 
education 
0.013*** 0.021*** 0.011** 0.018*** -0.002 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
R2 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 64,447 7,613 7,529 7,588 29,620 
Sibships 20,796 3,605 3,565 3,593 10,890 
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Table A24: Heterogeneity of birth order effects on educational investment depending on mothers’ 
education - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with mothers’ education 
in years 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 0.921 0.082 39.349 0.300 3174.237 
Second born  -0.007 -0.018*** -1.083*** -0.020*** -241.891*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.272) (0.006) (66.376) 
Third born 0.013 -0.038*** -0.579 -0.034*** -534.933*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.450) (0.010) (114.796) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.046*** -0.067*** 0.460 -0.046*** -639.245*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.674) (0.016) (177.945) 
Female -0.029*** -0.023*** -1.352*** -0.060*** -431.490*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.187) (0.004) (43.064) 
Second born 
#mothers’ education 
-0.000 0.001 0.030 -0.000 -33.951* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.043) (0.001) (17.345) 
Third born # 
mothers’ education 
-0.002* 0.002 -0.073 0.000 -5.780 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.078) (0.002) (30.301) 
Fourth to sixth born 
#mothers’ education 
-0.004*** 0.003* -0.128 0.001 7.106 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.122) (0.003) (47.440) 
Female # mothers’ 
education 
0.003*** 0.001*** 0.112*** 0.001** -25.963** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.001) (11.460) 
R2 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.18 
N 60,394 64,512 54,208 52,320 47,487 
Sibships 19,964 20,808 18,278 18,010 16,713 
 
Table A25: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in regions with natural versus 
unnatural sex ratios - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with a natural 
sex ratio dummy1 
 Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
 0.076 -0.006 0.007 -0.030 -1.934 
Second born  -0.190*** -0.143*** -0.112** -0.128*** -0.382*** 
 (0.013) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.037) 
Third born -0.359*** -0.272*** -0.209*** -0.306*** -0.759*** 
 (0.024) (0.074) (0.075) (0.071) (0.064) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.459*** -0.315*** -0.364*** -0.400*** -1.132*** 
 (0.037) (0.117) (0.112) (0.109) (0.099) 
Female -0.006 -0.060** -0.084*** -0.128*** -0.068*** 
 (0.009) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.025) 
Second born 
#Natural sex ratio 
-0.034 -0.001 -0.039 -0.089 0.103 
(0.021) (0.075) (0.073) (0.069) (0.077) 
Third born #natural 
sex ratio 
-0.003 0.039 0.073 0.021 0.244* 
(0.038) (0.138) (0.130) (0.121) (0.145) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# natural sex ratio 
0.036 -0.065 0.087 -0.140 0.214 
(0.060) (0.214) (0.193) (0.186) (0.220) 
Female # natural 
sex ratio 
0.030** 0.044 0.091* 0.006 0.024 
(0.014) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046) 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 64,577 7,628 7,544 7,603 29,647 
Sibships 20,829 3,610 3,570 3,598 10,898 
1 The natural sex ratio dummy=1 if there on average were more than 925 girls age 0-6 per 1000 boys age 0-6 in the 
2001 and 2011 population censuses 
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Table A26: Birth order effects on education investment in regions with natural versus unnatural sex 
ratios - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted with a natural sex ratio 
dummy1 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
Second born  -0.009** -0.009** -0.728*** -0.023*** -470.980*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.233) (0.006) (91.293) 
Third born 0.007 -0.031*** -0.320 -0.034*** -668.014*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.404) (0.011) (158.010) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.052*** -0.066*** 1.442** -0.045*** -793.536*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.617) (0.017) (239.113) 
Female -0.020*** -0.018*** -1.051*** -0.068*** -702.352*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.159) (0.004) (56.544) 
Second born 
#natural sex ratio 
-0.014** 0.009 -1.449*** 0.005 134.476 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.408) (0.009) (117.767) 
Third born #natural 
sex ratio 
-0.009 0.007 -1.652** -0.001 157.816 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.737) (0.016) (198.732) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# natural sex ratio 
-0.018 0.012 -2.417** -0.018 110.457 
(0.019) (0.018) (1.135) (0.025) (299.997) 
Female # natural sex 
ratio 
0.013*** -0.007 0.576** 0.030*** 360.211*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.272) (0.006) (75.016) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.15 
N 60,523 64,647 54,326 52,436 47,571 
Sibships 19,998 20,842 18,309 18,041 16,736 
1 The natural sex ratio dummy=1 if there on average were more than 925 girls age 0-6 per 1000 boys age 0-6 in 
the 2001 and 2011 population censuses 
 
Table A27: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in regions that scores worse and 
better on gender equality index - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted 
with a dummy for high score on gender equality index 1 
 Grades Reading Writing Math HAZ 
Mean 0.074 -0.006 0.005 -0.031 -1.937 
Second born  -0.200*** -0.194*** -0.152*** -0.190*** -0.309*** 
 (0.014) (0.042) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) 
Third born -0.369*** -0.307*** -0.235*** -0.339*** -0.624*** 
 (0.024) (0.073) (0.073) (0.067) (0.066) 
Fourth to sixth born -0.471*** -0.377*** -0.394*** -0.430*** -0.963*** 
 (0.038) (0.113) (0.105) (0.101) (0.103) 
Female -0.015 -0.085*** -0.073** -0.164*** -0.091*** 
 (0.010) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025) 
Second born 
#gender equal 
0.004 0.159** 0.069 0.069 -0.093 
(0.021) (0.078) (0.076) (0.074) (0.083) 
Third born # gender 
equal 
0.038 0.174 0.155 0.099 -0.110 
(0.038) (0.145) (0.137) (0.131) (0.155) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# gender equal 
0.082 0.171 0.223 -0.112 -0.221 
(0.059) (0.228) (0.207) (0.206) (0.233) 
Female # gender 
equal 
0.058*** 0.130*** 0.075 0.121** 0.103** 
(0.014) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) 
R2 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.05 
N 64,141 7,606 7,522 7,581 29,486 
Sibships 20,648 3,599 3,559 3,587 10,826 
1 The index is the “Women and children index” by the Public Affairs Centre, http://pai.pacindia.org/. It runs from 
0 to 1, with 1 representing the best possible score. A score above 0.55 is considered high.  
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Table A28: Birth order effects on current human capital indicators in regions that scores worse and 
better on gender equality index - coefficients from linear sibship fixed effects models fully interacted 
with a dummy for high score on gender equality index 1 
 Enrollment Child labor Hours Private Expenses 
 0.921 0.083 39.341 0.300 3154.681 
Second born  -0.008* -0.006 -0.717*** -0.022*** -445.302*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.237) (0.006) (86.230) 
Third born 0.003 -0.022*** -0.476 -0.027*** -542.217*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.407) (0.010) (146.315) 
Fourth to sixth born 0.040*** -0.053*** 1.026* -0.040** -660.120*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.618) (0.016) (218.479) 
Female -0.020*** -0.023*** -1.076*** -0.072*** -704.126*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.160) (0.004) (51.930) 
Second born 
#gender equal 
-0.016** -0.004 -1.304*** 0.005 110.801 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.421) (0.009) (117.398) 
Third born # gender 
equal 
0.000 -0.023* -0.984 -0.019 -88.618 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.767) (0.016) (198.441) 
Fourth to sixth born 
# gender equal 
0.006 -0.027 -1.107 -0.036 -134.856 
(0.019) (0.018) (1.189) (0.025) (298.769) 
Female # gender 
equal 
0.012*** 0.006 0.621** 0.043*** 382.811*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.275) (0.006) (77.329) 
R2 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.15 
N 60,096 64,211 54,013 52,052 47,204 
Sibships 19,820 20,661 18,181 17,878 16,581 
1 The index is the “Women and children index” by the Public Affairs Centre, http://pai.pacindia.org/. It runs from 
0 to 1, with 1 representing the best possible score. A score above 0.55 is considered high. 
 
